Constraints on Discretion: Part 2—Shareholders

C. Gerner-Beuerle, M. Schillig
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Abstract

This chapter distinguishes between the constraints imposed on the majority or controlling shareholder in the context of business operations that affect the minority detrimentally but do not result in a change in ownership of the business, and in sale of control transactions, such as a merger, sale of all or almost all of the company’s assets, or a takeover. In both cases, agency problems arise between majority and minority shareholders, but legal systems provide for distinct solutions that reflect the different economic importance of the two types of transactions and the fact that minority shareholders are particularly vulnerable to collective action problems when control of the company changes hands.
自由裁量权的约束:第二部分——股东
本章区分了在对少数股东产生不利影响但不会导致企业所有权变化的业务经营背景下对多数股东或控股股东施加的限制,以及在出售控制交易(如合并、出售公司全部或几乎全部资产或收购)时施加的限制。在这两种情况下,代理问题都出现在大股东和小股东之间,但法律制度提供了不同的解决方案,反映了这两种类型的交易的不同经济重要性,以及小股东在公司控制权易手时特别容易受到集体行动问题的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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