Preemption and Entrenchment of the State/Local Divide

C. Gillette
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Abstract

Recent state legislative enactments that preempt local legislation also include novel provisions that impose significant penalties on municipalities or individuals who challenge the state’s action. These penalties include loss of funding or loss of office for localities or officials who assert a local right to pursue policies in conflict with the state legislation. Notwithstanding widespread criticism of the practice, commentators have concluded that the traditional conception of the state’s plenary power over its municipalities, a restrictive view of home rule, and the absence of a federal constitutional violation leave affected municipalities and individuals with little legal recourse against “penalty preemption.” This article proposes an interpretation of state constitutions under which penalty preemption would largely be declared invalid. That interpretation asserts that state constitutions do not, in fact, provide legislative authority over political subdivisions that is as plenary as states have asserted. Instead, state constitutions have historically been interpreted as containing both explicit and, importantly, implicit principles that constrain legislative action. Courts have invoked those implicit principles to invalidate legislation enacted at the behest of a politically dominant group that is seeking to entrench its current majority position over an area that is reasonably viewed as subject to the vicissitudes of normal politics. This article contends that the proper allocation of authority between states and their political subdivisions constitutes such an area of contestation. By entrenching the dividing line between state and local authority, penalty preemption legislation represents an exercise of raw political power rather than an effort to allocate government authority in accordance with any principle that is appropriate for state preemption. Courts have the capacity to invalidate legislative entrenchment of the state/local divide that constitutes such an assertion of political power just as they done with respect to other efforts to entrench temporary majorities.
州/地方分界的抢占和巩固
最近的州立法法规优先于地方立法,还包括对挑战州政府行为的市政当局或个人施加重大惩罚的新条款。这些惩罚措施包括,地方政府或官员因主张地方有权推行与州立法相冲突的政策而被剥夺资金或职位。尽管这种做法受到广泛的批评,但评论家们得出的结论是,国家对其市政当局的全部权力的传统观念,对地方自治的限制性观点,以及没有违反联邦宪法的情况,使得受影响的市政当局和个人几乎没有法律追索权来反对“惩罚优先”。本文提出了一种对州宪法的解释,在这种解释下,惩罚优先将在很大程度上被宣布无效。这种解释认为,事实上,州宪法并没有像各州所主张的那样,对政治分支提供完全的立法权力。相反,州宪法在历史上被解释为包含明确的和重要的是隐含的约束立法行动的原则。法院援引这些隐含的原则,使应一个政治上占主导地位的集团的要求制定的立法无效,该集团正寻求巩固其目前在一个被合理地视为受正常政治变迁影响的地区的多数地位。本文认为,在国家及其政治分支之间适当分配权力构成了这样一个争议领域。通过巩固州和地方当局之间的分界线,惩罚优先立法代表了原始政治权力的行使,而不是根据适用于州优先的任何原则分配政府权力的努力。法院有能力使州/地方划分的立法巩固无效,这构成了政治权力的主张,就像他们在其他巩固临时多数的努力中所做的那样。
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