{"title":"Research on Cooperative Emission Reduction Strategy for Supply Chain Considering Yield Uncertainty and Low Carbon Preference","authors":"Xueying Cao, Zhi-gao Liao, Lin Deng","doi":"10.2991/assehr.k.191221.148","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"under the carbon tax and government carbon emission reduction subsidy policy, a two-level supply chain cooperative emission reduction game model consisting of suppliers and manufacturers is constructed, where manufacturers are faced with yield uncertainty. The emission reduction decision of decentralized decision and the centralized decision is analyzed. It is proved that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision to realize Pareto improvement of supply chain. On this basis, three different cooperative emission reduction methods were proposed to explore the strategic selection of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under uncertain production environment. The results show that the cost-sharing contract and profit-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty well. Cost-sharing and profit-sharing contracts can maximize the level of emission reduction and the profits of the whole supply chain and perfectly coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty. Keywords—yield uncertainty; Low carbon preference; Lowcarbon supply chain; Cost sharing; Profit sharing","PeriodicalId":143493,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Education, Economics and Management Research (ICEEMR 2019)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Education, Economics and Management Research (ICEEMR 2019)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.191221.148","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
under the carbon tax and government carbon emission reduction subsidy policy, a two-level supply chain cooperative emission reduction game model consisting of suppliers and manufacturers is constructed, where manufacturers are faced with yield uncertainty. The emission reduction decision of decentralized decision and the centralized decision is analyzed. It is proved that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision to realize Pareto improvement of supply chain. On this basis, three different cooperative emission reduction methods were proposed to explore the strategic selection of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under uncertain production environment. The results show that the cost-sharing contract and profit-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty well. Cost-sharing and profit-sharing contracts can maximize the level of emission reduction and the profits of the whole supply chain and perfectly coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty. Keywords—yield uncertainty; Low carbon preference; Lowcarbon supply chain; Cost sharing; Profit sharing