Research on Cooperative Emission Reduction Strategy for Supply Chain Considering Yield Uncertainty and Low Carbon Preference

Xueying Cao, Zhi-gao Liao, Lin Deng
{"title":"Research on Cooperative Emission Reduction Strategy for Supply Chain Considering Yield Uncertainty and Low Carbon Preference","authors":"Xueying Cao, Zhi-gao Liao, Lin Deng","doi":"10.2991/assehr.k.191221.148","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"under the carbon tax and government carbon emission reduction subsidy policy, a two-level supply chain cooperative emission reduction game model consisting of suppliers and manufacturers is constructed, where manufacturers are faced with yield uncertainty. The emission reduction decision of decentralized decision and the centralized decision is analyzed. It is proved that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision to realize Pareto improvement of supply chain. On this basis, three different cooperative emission reduction methods were proposed to explore the strategic selection of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under uncertain production environment. The results show that the cost-sharing contract and profit-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty well. Cost-sharing and profit-sharing contracts can maximize the level of emission reduction and the profits of the whole supply chain and perfectly coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty. Keywords—yield uncertainty; Low carbon preference; Lowcarbon supply chain; Cost sharing; Profit sharing","PeriodicalId":143493,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Education, Economics and Management Research (ICEEMR 2019)","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Conference on Education, Economics and Management Research (ICEEMR 2019)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.191221.148","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

under the carbon tax and government carbon emission reduction subsidy policy, a two-level supply chain cooperative emission reduction game model consisting of suppliers and manufacturers is constructed, where manufacturers are faced with yield uncertainty. The emission reduction decision of decentralized decision and the centralized decision is analyzed. It is proved that centralized decision is better than decentralized decision to realize Pareto improvement of supply chain. On this basis, three different cooperative emission reduction methods were proposed to explore the strategic selection of cooperative emission reduction in supply chain under uncertain production environment. The results show that the cost-sharing contract and profit-sharing contract cannot coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty well. Cost-sharing and profit-sharing contracts can maximize the level of emission reduction and the profits of the whole supply chain and perfectly coordinate supply chain and yield uncertainty. Keywords—yield uncertainty; Low carbon preference; Lowcarbon supply chain; Cost sharing; Profit sharing
考虑产量不确定性和低碳偏好的供应链协同减排策略研究
在碳税和政府碳减排补贴政策下,构建了由供应商和制造商组成的两级供应链合作减排博弈模型,其中制造商面临收益不确定性。对分散决策和集中决策的减排决策进行了分析。证明了集中决策比分散决策更能实现供应链的帕累托改进。在此基础上,提出了三种不同的合作减排方式,探讨不确定生产环境下供应链合作减排的战略选择。结果表明,成本分担合同和利润共享合同不能很好地协调供应链和产量不确定性。成本分担和利润分享合同可以使整个供应链的减排水平和利润最大化,并能很好地协调供应链和收益不确定性。Keywords-yield不确定性;低碳偏好;低碳供应链;成本分摊;利润分享
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信