Lingguang Lei, Yi He, Kun Sun, Jiwu Jing, Yuewu Wang, Qi Li, J. Weng
{"title":"Vulnerable Implicit Service: A Revisit","authors":"Lingguang Lei, Yi He, Kun Sun, Jiwu Jing, Yuewu Wang, Qi Li, J. Weng","doi":"10.1145/3133956.3133975","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The services in Android applications can be invoked either explicitly or implicitly before Android 5.0. However, since the implicit service invocations suffer service hijacking attacks and thus lead to sensitive information leakage, they have been forbidden since Android 5.0. Thereafter since the Android system will simply throw an exception and crash the application that still invokes services implicitly, it was expected that application developers will be forced to convert the implicit service invocations to explicit ones by specifying the package name of the service to be called. In this paper, we revisit the service invocations by analyzing two sets of the same 1390 applications downloaded from Google Play Store before and after the the implicit service forbidden policy is enforced. We develop a static analysis framework called ISA to perform our study. Our analysis results show that the forbidden policy effectively reduces the number of vulnerable service invocations from 643 to 112, namely, 82.58% reduction. However, after a detailed analysis of the remaining 112 vulnerable invocations, we discover that the forbidden policy fails to resolve the service hijacking attacks. Among the 1390 applications downloaded in May 2017, we find 36 popular applications still vulnerable to service hijacking attacks, which can lead to the loss of user bank account and VPN login credentials, etc. Moreover, we find that the forbidden policy introduces a new type of denial of service attacks. Finally, we discuss the root challenges on resolving service hijacking attacks and propose countermeasures to help mitigate the service hijacking attacks.","PeriodicalId":191367,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-10-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3133975","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
The services in Android applications can be invoked either explicitly or implicitly before Android 5.0. However, since the implicit service invocations suffer service hijacking attacks and thus lead to sensitive information leakage, they have been forbidden since Android 5.0. Thereafter since the Android system will simply throw an exception and crash the application that still invokes services implicitly, it was expected that application developers will be forced to convert the implicit service invocations to explicit ones by specifying the package name of the service to be called. In this paper, we revisit the service invocations by analyzing two sets of the same 1390 applications downloaded from Google Play Store before and after the the implicit service forbidden policy is enforced. We develop a static analysis framework called ISA to perform our study. Our analysis results show that the forbidden policy effectively reduces the number of vulnerable service invocations from 643 to 112, namely, 82.58% reduction. However, after a detailed analysis of the remaining 112 vulnerable invocations, we discover that the forbidden policy fails to resolve the service hijacking attacks. Among the 1390 applications downloaded in May 2017, we find 36 popular applications still vulnerable to service hijacking attacks, which can lead to the loss of user bank account and VPN login credentials, etc. Moreover, we find that the forbidden policy introduces a new type of denial of service attacks. Finally, we discuss the root challenges on resolving service hijacking attacks and propose countermeasures to help mitigate the service hijacking attacks.
Android应用程序中的服务可以在Android 5.0之前显式或隐式地调用。但是,由于隐式服务调用遭受服务劫持攻击,导致敏感信息泄露,因此从Android 5.0开始,隐式服务调用被禁止。此后,由于Android系统将抛出一个异常并使仍然隐式调用服务的应用程序崩溃,因此预计应用程序开发人员将被迫通过指定要调用的服务的包名将隐式服务调用转换为显式服务调用。在本文中,我们通过分析隐含服务禁止策略实施前后从Google Play Store下载的两组相同的1390个应用程序来重新审视服务调用。我们开发了一个称为ISA的静态分析框架来执行我们的研究。分析结果表明,禁用策略有效地将脆弱服务调用从643个减少到112个,即减少82.58%。然而,在对剩下的112个易受攻击的调用进行详细分析后,我们发现禁止策略无法解决服务劫持攻击。在2017年5月下载的1390个应用程序中,我们发现36个热门应用程序仍然容易受到服务劫持攻击,这可能导致用户银行账户和VPN登录凭据丢失等。此外,我们发现禁止策略引入了一种新型的拒绝服务攻击。最后,我们讨论了解决服务劫持攻击的根本挑战,并提出了缓解服务劫持攻击的对策。