Breaking Geographic Routing Among Connected Vehicles

Zizheng Liu, Shaan Shekhar, Chunyi Peng
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Abstract

Geographic routing for connected vehicles enables vehicles and roadside infrastructure to exchange information about traffic conditions and road hazards based on their geographic positions. Its security is thus critical to traffic efficiency and road safety. In this paper, we conduct a security analysis of one standardized geographic routing protocol - GeoNetworking-and unfortunately find that its packet forwarding algorithms are vulnerable to two simple attacks. The first inter-area interception attack disturbs the victim vehicle's routing decision making and intercepts packets transmitted from one area to another. The second intra-area blockage attack intervenes packet forwarding within an area by impersonating a packet forwarder in a contention based flooding process; The attacker injects fake packets to its nearby peers and prevents vehicles within an area from receiving the broadcast packets. We use an open-source simulator to evaluate the effectiveness of proof-of-concept attacks and assess their attack damages under the settings released in public field tests. The first attack achieves an inter-area interception rate up to 99.9% (>35% in all test cases); The second attack reaches an intra-area packet blockage rate between 35% and 39%, which implies that about one-third vehicles within an area fail to receive broadcast packets. These attacks cause unnecessary traffic jams and collisions which could be avoided if GeoNetworking is properly secured. We further propose standard-compatible solutions to mitigating both attacks and conduct a preliminary evaluation to validate their effectiveness.
打破互联车辆之间的地理路由
联网车辆的地理路由使车辆和路边基础设施能够根据其地理位置交换交通状况和道路危险信息。因此,它的安全对交通效率和道路安全至关重要。在本文中,我们对一种标准化地理路由协议geonet.net进行了安全分析,不幸的是,我们发现它的数据包转发算法容易受到两种简单的攻击。第一种跨区域拦截攻击干扰受害者车辆的路由决策,拦截从一个区域传输到另一个区域的数据包。第二区域内阻塞攻击通过在基于争用的泛洪过程中模拟数据包转发器来干预区域内的数据包转发;攻击者向附近的对等体注入假报文,阻止区域内的车辆接收到广播报文。我们使用一个开源模拟器来评估概念验证攻击的有效性,并评估其在公共现场测试中发布的设置下的攻击损害。第一次攻击实现了99.9%的区域间拦截率(在所有测试用例中>35%);第二次攻击的区域内数据包阻塞率在35% ~ 39%之间,这意味着一个区域内约有三分之一的车辆无法接收广播数据包。这些攻击会导致不必要的交通堵塞和碰撞,如果GeoNetworking得到适当的保护,这些攻击是可以避免的。我们进一步提出标准兼容的解决方案来减轻这两种攻击,并进行初步评估以验证其有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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