Implementing Trust in Cloud Infrastructures

R. Neisse, Dominik Holling, A. Pretschner
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引用次数: 69

Abstract

Today's cloud computing infrastructures usually require customers who transfer data into the cloud to trust the providers of the cloud infrastructure. Not every customer is willing to grant this trust without justification. It should be possible to detect that at least the configuration of the cloud infrastructure -- as provided in the form of a hyper visor and administrative domain software -- has not been changed without the customer's consent. We present a system that enables periodical and necessity-driven integrity measurements and remote attestations of vital parts of cloud computing infrastructures. Building on the analysis of several relevant attack scenarios, our system is implemented on top of the Xen Cloud Platform and makes use of trusted computing technology to provide security guarantees. We evaluate both security and performance of this system. We show how our system attests the integrity of a cloud infrastructure and detects all changes performed by system administrators in a typical software configuration, even in the presence of a simulated denial-of-service attack.
在云基础设施中实现信任
今天的云计算基础设施通常要求将数据传输到云中的客户信任云基础设施的提供商。不是每个客户都愿意在没有正当理由的情况下给予这种信任。在未经客户同意的情况下,至少应该可以检测到云基础设施的配置(以超级保护器和管理域软件的形式提供)没有被更改。我们提出了一个系统,该系统可以对云计算基础设施的重要部分进行周期性和必要性驱动的完整性测量和远程认证。在分析了几种相关攻击场景的基础上,我们的系统在Xen云平台上实现,并利用可信计算技术提供安全保障。我们对该系统的安全性和性能进行了评估。我们将展示我们的系统如何证明云基础设施的完整性,并检测系统管理员在典型软件配置中执行的所有更改,即使在存在模拟拒绝服务攻击的情况下也是如此。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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