Social Ontology

Abstract

Traditionally, social entities (i.e., social properties, facts, kinds, groups, institutions, and structures) have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. In this chapter, we consider whether the exclusion of social entities from mainstream metaphysics is philosophically warranted or if it instead rests on historical accident or bias. We examine three ways one might attempt to justify excluding social metaphysics from the domain of metaphysical inquiry and argue that each ​fails. Thus, we conclude that social entities are not justifiably excluded from metaphysical inquiry. Finally, we ask how focusing on social entities could change the character of metaphysical inquiry. We suggest ​that starting from examples of social entities might lead metaphysicians to rethink the assumption that describing reality in terms of intrinsic, independent, and individualistic features is preferable to describing it in terms of relational, dependent, and non-individualistic features. Traditionally, social entities have not fallen within the purview of mainstream metaphysics. For example, very few original research articles on social metaphysics have been published in top philosophy journals. Moreover, only one metaphysics textbook includes social metaphysics as a 1 topic. This is particularly striking in view of the fact that there has been work on social ontology 2 for decades. Here, in addition to surveying the field of social ontology, we consider whether the 3 1 This claim is easily verified by searching keywords such as “social,” “social kind,” “social group,” etc., top philosophy journals (e.g., ​Philosophical Review, the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Nous, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies​, etc.). 2 For example, see Carroll and Markosian 2010; Conee and Sider 2014; Crane and Farkas 2004; Effingham 2013; Kim, Korman, and Sosa 2011; Koons and Pickavance 2015, 2017; Loux and Crisp 2017; Loux 2008; Lowe 2002; Mumford 2012; Sider, Hawthorne, Zimmerman 2007; Tahko 2016; van Inwagen 2014; van Inwagen and Zimmerman 2008. Most of these titles were published well after the inception of social metaphysics in analytic philosophy. NB: Ney’s (2014) introductory metaphysics textbook includes a chapter on the metaphysics of race. 3 For instance, Ruben 1985; Gilbert 1989; Tuomela 1989; and Searle 1990, 1995, 2010; Hacking 1996, 1999; Haslanger 1995; Burman (Andersson) 2007, in addition to more than 30 years of work on the metaphysics of race and gender (e.g., Appiah 1985). Other work on collective