{"title":"Is the Constitution in Harm's Way?Substantive Due Process and Criminal Law","authors":"E. Tennen","doi":"10.15779/Z38JK7W","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"¶1. For quite some time, scholars have debated whether or not there are any constitutional limits to substantive criminal law.[1] Although the Court has cautiously resisted the chance to constitutionalize criminal law overtly, it has been delving into substantive criminal law since the turn of the twentieth century.[2] To be sure, the Court often disguises these forays as cases about substantive due process generally, and privacy, specifically.","PeriodicalId":386851,"journal":{"name":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Berkeley Journal of Criminal Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38JK7W","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
¶1. For quite some time, scholars have debated whether or not there are any constitutional limits to substantive criminal law.[1] Although the Court has cautiously resisted the chance to constitutionalize criminal law overtly, it has been delving into substantive criminal law since the turn of the twentieth century.[2] To be sure, the Court often disguises these forays as cases about substantive due process generally, and privacy, specifically.