Ensuring the security of warfighters' satcom via programmable cryptographic devices

Abstract

The National Security Agency's Cryptographic Modernization Initiative (CMI) has far reaching implications for the Information Assurance required on military satellites. The programmability tenet, one of six tenets defined in the National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS) Policy 3-9, provides the greatest return on investment (ROI) by prolonging a satellite's useful life, but also presents the greatest technological risk. This paper explores trades between current performance capabilities and programmability based on available and planned technology. Algorithm transitioning, forecasting the size and complexity of future algorithms, recertification, and redundancy are technology concerns that are addressed. Several issues are highlighted and a process is proposed that can be used to determine the best return on investment for the government, including technology projections and cost as an independent variable. The end goal is ensuring the security of the Warfighter