REF: resource elasticity fairness with sharing incentives for multiprocessors

Abstract

With the democratization of cloud and datacenter computing, users increasingly share large hardware platforms. In this setting, architects encounter two challenges: sharing fairly and sharing multiple resources. Drawing on economic game-theory, we rethink fairness in computer architecture. A fair allocation must provide sharing incentives (SI), envy-freeness (EF), and Pareto efficiency (PE). We show that Cobb-Douglas utility functions are well suited to modeling user preferences for cache capacity and memory bandwidth. And we present an allocation mechanism that uses Cobb-Douglas preferences to determine each user's fair share of the hardware. This mechanism provably guarantees SI, EF, and PE, as well as strategy-proofness in the large (SPL). And it does so with modest performance penalties, less than 10\% throughput loss, relative to an unfair mechanism.