Adding Bite to the Zone of Twilight: Applying Kisor to Revitalize the Youngstown Tripartite

Z. Singer
{"title":"Adding Bite to the Zone of Twilight: Applying Kisor to Revitalize the Youngstown Tripartite","authors":"Z. Singer","doi":"10.36640/mjeal.10.2.adding","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the half century and more since Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fog surrounding acceptable executive power in national security and foreign affairs has only thickened. Today, whether presidents are responding to the challenges of an amorphous global war on terrorism or a global pandemic, they act against a backdrop of ambiguous constitutional and statutory authorization and shifting precedent. While Justice Jackson outlined zones of presidential power by tying that power to congressional acts, the Court subsequently watered down the test by looking to other factors, like legislative intent. At other times, the Court appeared to jettison the Youngstown zones for uncertain statutory analyses. Responding to the changing precedent, some scholars and practitioners called for deference for executive actions in national security and beyond. Others called for using the same statutory tools as in any other case.\n\nA compromise is available. For courts seeking to remain faithful to Youngstown while recognizing calls for executive deference, I argue that they should look toward recent administrative law precedents. There, courts confront challenges similar to those in the national security and foreign affairs realms—unclear statutes and regulations, an inability to legislate with specificity, and political actors with more subject-matter expertise than the judiciary. The two-part test outlined in Kisor v. Wilkie, which focuses on whether a regulation is ambiguous and whether the character and context of the agency’s actions warrant deference, is the available compromise. The Kisor test would not only infuse clarity into Justice Jackson’s tripartite system, but would foster improved incentives for the political branches, such as encouraging the executive to utilize internal and external processes deserving of deference, while also serving as a measured restraint on the judiciary.","PeriodicalId":302203,"journal":{"name":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","volume":"47 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.36640/mjeal.10.2.adding","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

In the half century and more since Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fog surrounding acceptable executive power in national security and foreign affairs has only thickened. Today, whether presidents are responding to the challenges of an amorphous global war on terrorism or a global pandemic, they act against a backdrop of ambiguous constitutional and statutory authorization and shifting precedent. While Justice Jackson outlined zones of presidential power by tying that power to congressional acts, the Court subsequently watered down the test by looking to other factors, like legislative intent. At other times, the Court appeared to jettison the Youngstown zones for uncertain statutory analyses. Responding to the changing precedent, some scholars and practitioners called for deference for executive actions in national security and beyond. Others called for using the same statutory tools as in any other case. A compromise is available. For courts seeking to remain faithful to Youngstown while recognizing calls for executive deference, I argue that they should look toward recent administrative law precedents. There, courts confront challenges similar to those in the national security and foreign affairs realms—unclear statutes and regulations, an inability to legislate with specificity, and political actors with more subject-matter expertise than the judiciary. The two-part test outlined in Kisor v. Wilkie, which focuses on whether a regulation is ambiguous and whether the character and context of the agency’s actions warrant deference, is the available compromise. The Kisor test would not only infuse clarity into Justice Jackson’s tripartite system, but would foster improved incentives for the political branches, such as encouraging the executive to utilize internal and external processes deserving of deference, while also serving as a measured restraint on the judiciary.
为暮光地带增添活力:应用Kisor来振兴扬斯敦三方
自从杰克逊大法官在扬斯敦Sheet & Tube Co.诉索耶案中达成著名的共识以来,半个多世纪以来,围绕在国家安全和外交事务中可接受的行政权力的迷雾只增不增。今天,无论总统是在应对一场无定形的全球反恐战争还是全球流行病的挑战,他们的行动都是在宪法和法律授权含糊不清、先例不断变化的背景下进行的。虽然杰克逊大法官通过将总统权力与国会法案联系起来,概述了总统权力的范围,但最高法院随后通过考虑立法意图等其他因素,淡化了这种检验。在其他时候,法院似乎为了不确定的法律分析而抛弃了扬斯敦地区。针对不断变化的先例,一些学者和实践者呼吁在国家安全和其他领域尊重行政行为。其他人则要求使用与其他案件相同的法定工具。妥协是可行的。对于寻求忠实于扬斯敦的法院,同时承认行政服从的呼声,我认为他们应该参考最近的行政法先例。在那里,法院面临着与国家安全和外交事务领域类似的挑战——不明确的法规和条例,无法具体立法,以及政治行为者比司法机构更有专业知识。在Kisor v. Wilkie中概述的两部分测试是可用的折衷方案,该测试侧重于监管是否含糊不清,以及机构行为的性质和背景是否值得尊重。Kisor测试不仅将为杰克逊法官的三权分立体系注入清晰的信息,而且还将促进对政治部门的改进激励,例如鼓励行政部门利用值得尊重的内部和外部程序,同时也将对司法部门起到适度的约束作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信