Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies in Europe

ERN: Taxation Pub Date : 2011-10-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2710611
M. Kretschmer
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引用次数: 33

Abstract

Following the Information Society Directive of 2001 (introducing the concept of “fair compensation” for private copying into EU Law), total collection from levies on copying media and equipment in the EU tripled, from about €170m to more than €500m per annum. Levy schemes exist now in 22 out of 27 Member States (with only the UK, Ireland, Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg remaining outside). Despite their wide adoption, levy systems are little understood, both in respect of their rationale and their economic consequences. Tariffs are increasingly contested in court, leading to a large gap between claimed and collected revenues. The European Commission has announced “comprehensive legislative action” for 2012. This report offers the first independent empirical assessment of the European levy system as a whole. The research consolidates the evidence on levy setting, collection and distribution; reviews the scope of consumer permissions associated with levy payments; and reports the results of three product level studies (printer/scanners, portable music/video/game devices, and tablet computers), analysing the relationship between VAT, levy tariffs and retail prices in 20 levy and non�levy countries. Key findings: There are dramatic differences between countries in the methodology used for identifying leviable devices, setting tariffs, and allocating beneficiaries of the levy. There are levies on blank media in 22 EU countries, on MP3 players in 18 countries, on printers in 12 countries, on personal computers in 4 countries. Revenues collected per capita vary between €0.02 (Romania) and €2.6 (France). The distribution of levy revenues to recording artists is less than €0.01 per album These variations cannot be explained by an underlying concept of economic harm to rightholders from private copying The scope of consumer permissions under the statutory exceptions for private copying within the EU vary, and generally do not match with what consumers ordinarily understand as private activities In levy countries, the costs of levies as an indirect tax are not always passed on to the consumer. In competitive markets, such as those for printers, manufacturers of levied goods appear to absorb the levy. There appears to be a pan-European retail price range for many consumer devices regardless of levy schemes (with the exception of Scandinavia). In non-levy countries, such as the UK, a certain amount of private copying is already priced into retail purchases. For example, right holders have either explicitly permitted acts of format shifting, or decided not to enforce their exclusive rights. Commercial practice will not change as a result of introducing a narrowly conceived private copying exception. A more widely conceived exception that would cover private activities that take place in digital networks (such as downloading for personal use, or non-commercial adaptation and distribution within networks of friends) may be best understood not as an exception but as a statutory licence. Such a licence could include state regulated payments with levy characteristics as part of a wider overhaul of the copyright system, facilitating the growth of new digital services.
私人复制与公平补偿:欧洲版权征收的实证研究
根据2001年的信息社会指令(将私人复制的“公平补偿”概念引入欧盟法律),欧盟对复制媒体和设备的征税总额增加了两倍,从每年约1.7亿欧元增加到5亿多欧元。目前,欧盟27个成员国中有22个国家存在征税制度(只有英国、爱尔兰、马耳他、塞浦路斯和卢森堡仍未加入)。尽管征税制度被广泛采用,但人们对其原理和经济后果都知之甚少。关税在法庭上的争议越来越多,导致索赔收入与实际收入之间存在巨大差距。欧盟委员会宣布了2012年的“全面立法行动”。本报告提供了第一个独立的实证评估欧洲征税制度作为一个整体。本研究整合了税收设置、征收和分配的证据;检讨与征费支付有关的消费者许可范围;并报告了三个产品水平研究的结果(打印机/扫描仪,便携式音乐/视频/游戏设备和平板电脑),分析了20个征税和非征税国家的增值税,征收关税和零售价格之间的关系。主要发现:各国在确定征税设备、设定关税和分配征税受益者的方法上存在巨大差异。22个欧盟国家对空白媒体征税,18个国家对MP3播放器征税,12个国家对打印机征税,4个国家对个人电脑征税。人均收入在0.02欧元(罗马尼亚)和2.6欧元(法国)之间。向唱片艺术家分配的税收收入低于每张专辑0.01欧元,这些变化不能用私人复制对权利人造成经济损害的基本概念来解释。欧盟内部私人复制的法定例外下消费者许可的范围各不相同,并且通常与消费者通常理解的私人活动不匹配在征收国家,作为间接税的征收成本并不总是转嫁给消费者。在竞争激烈的市场中,比如印刷市场,被征收商品的制造商似乎会吸收税收。无论征税方案如何(斯堪的纳维亚半岛除外),许多消费设备似乎都有一个泛欧零售价格范围。在英国等不征税的国家,一定数量的私人复制已经被计入零售购买价格。例如,权利人要么明确允许格式转换行为,要么决定不执行其专有权。商业实践不会因为引入狭义的私有复制例外而改变。一种更为广泛构想的例外,将涵盖在数字网络中发生的私人活动(例如为个人使用而下载,或在朋友网络中进行非商业改编和分发),最好不是将其理解为例外,而是理解为法定许可。这样的许可证可以包括国家监管的具有征税特征的支付,作为版权体系更广泛改革的一部分,促进新的数字服务的发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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