Believing under coercion: Consideration of Locke’s argument in favor of tolerance

Abstract

In this paper, I consider Locke?s argument in favor of religious tolerance, which emphasizes the irrationality of the state?s attempts to influence the change of belief because the very character of belief is such that it is not susceptible to the state?s means. In the first part of the paper I will try to show using conceptual analysis that contrary to the common opinion that there is no causal connection between violence and believing, it is not entirely impossible to believe under coercion in the broader sense of the term - as an intervention that bypass the rationality of the agent. In the second part of the paper, the focus shifts from the original argument to its revised version in which the notion of authenticity takes a central place. Instead of a misdirected search for beliefs that are not the outcome of any influence, it is necessary to determine more closely the character of the causal history that generates authentic beliefs. Therefore, I develop Lockean distinction between legitimate and illegitimate influences, which ought to inform contemporary thinking about tolerance.