{"title":"Unilateral Trade Sanctions to Secure Compliance with the Common Concern Doctrine","authors":"Zakeri Ahmad","doi":"10.1163/9789004446090_008","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In continuation of examining different aspects of the Common Concern doctrine with respect to the role of trade in clean technology diffusion, this final chapter deals with the last and possibly the most controversial issue, i.e. unilateral countermeasures to respond to unaddressed common concerns across borders. Consequently, the general theme is the feasibility and consequence of unilateral trade sanctions as per dictates of the Common Concern doctrine to ensure compliance with the proposed narrative of lowcarbon technology (lct) diffusion. There are a number of issues to unpack in this regard, which are taken up in sequence. The chapter begins by sketching out the opposing views on the utility of unilateralism, especially trade sanctions. Like many contested areas of international law, the proponents of the approach see the benefit of sure compliance in sanctions, whereas the sceptics find the threat thereof as cooperation deterrent. To place the doctrine in the midst of the debate, it would be important to clarify how it may maximise the proclaimed benefits while minimising the predicted challenges. Going further, the chapter briefly outlines the grey areas of international law regarding unilateral actions, third party countermeasures in particular, and discusses the advancement thereupon made by the doctrine. Lastly, turning to the trade domain, it is recalled that unilateral sanctions are inherently illegal in the multilateral system, with some avenues to bring ex post legitimacy to actions when challenged. One question would be what, if any, additional benefit is brought by introducing the doctrine of Common Concern. Another is whether one should reconsider making such forwardlooking suggestions in the currently unfolding geopolitical reality of mistrust and economic warfare. Detailed discussions follow hereunder.","PeriodicalId":154957,"journal":{"name":"WTO Law and Trade Policy Reform for Low-Carbon Technology Diffusion","volume":"150 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"WTO Law and Trade Policy Reform for Low-Carbon Technology Diffusion","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004446090_008","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In continuation of examining different aspects of the Common Concern doctrine with respect to the role of trade in clean technology diffusion, this final chapter deals with the last and possibly the most controversial issue, i.e. unilateral countermeasures to respond to unaddressed common concerns across borders. Consequently, the general theme is the feasibility and consequence of unilateral trade sanctions as per dictates of the Common Concern doctrine to ensure compliance with the proposed narrative of lowcarbon technology (lct) diffusion. There are a number of issues to unpack in this regard, which are taken up in sequence. The chapter begins by sketching out the opposing views on the utility of unilateralism, especially trade sanctions. Like many contested areas of international law, the proponents of the approach see the benefit of sure compliance in sanctions, whereas the sceptics find the threat thereof as cooperation deterrent. To place the doctrine in the midst of the debate, it would be important to clarify how it may maximise the proclaimed benefits while minimising the predicted challenges. Going further, the chapter briefly outlines the grey areas of international law regarding unilateral actions, third party countermeasures in particular, and discusses the advancement thereupon made by the doctrine. Lastly, turning to the trade domain, it is recalled that unilateral sanctions are inherently illegal in the multilateral system, with some avenues to bring ex post legitimacy to actions when challenged. One question would be what, if any, additional benefit is brought by introducing the doctrine of Common Concern. Another is whether one should reconsider making such forwardlooking suggestions in the currently unfolding geopolitical reality of mistrust and economic warfare. Detailed discussions follow hereunder.