Firewalling Scenic Routes: Preventing Data Exfiltration via Political and Geographic Routing Policies

Kevin Benton, L. Camp
{"title":"Firewalling Scenic Routes: Preventing Data Exfiltration via Political and Geographic Routing Policies","authors":"Kevin Benton, L. Camp","doi":"10.1145/2994475.2994477","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we describe a system that allows the real time creation of firewall rules in response to geographic and political changes in the control-plane. This allows an organization to mitigate data exfiltration threats by analyzing Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates and blocking packets from being routed through problematic jurisdictions. By inspecting the autonomous system paths and referencing external data sources about the autonomous systems, a BGP participant can infer the countries that traffic to a particular destination address will traverse. Based on this information, an organization can then define constraints on its egress traffic to prevent sensitive data from being sent via an untrusted region. In light of the many route leaks and BGP hijacks that occur today, this offers a new option to organizations willing to accept reduced availability over the risk to confidentiality. Similar to firewalls that allow organizations to block traffic originating from specific countries, our approach allows blocking outbound traffic from transiting specific jurisdictions. To illustrate the efficacy of this approach, we provide an analysis of paths to various financial services IP addresses over the course of a month from a single BGP vantage point that quantifies the frequency of path alterations resulting in the traversal of new countries. We conclude with an argument for the utility of country-based egress policies that do not require the cooperation of upstream providers.","PeriodicalId":343057,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2016 ACM Workshop on Automated Decision Making for Active Cyber Defense","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2994475.2994477","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

Abstract

In this paper we describe a system that allows the real time creation of firewall rules in response to geographic and political changes in the control-plane. This allows an organization to mitigate data exfiltration threats by analyzing Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) updates and blocking packets from being routed through problematic jurisdictions. By inspecting the autonomous system paths and referencing external data sources about the autonomous systems, a BGP participant can infer the countries that traffic to a particular destination address will traverse. Based on this information, an organization can then define constraints on its egress traffic to prevent sensitive data from being sent via an untrusted region. In light of the many route leaks and BGP hijacks that occur today, this offers a new option to organizations willing to accept reduced availability over the risk to confidentiality. Similar to firewalls that allow organizations to block traffic originating from specific countries, our approach allows blocking outbound traffic from transiting specific jurisdictions. To illustrate the efficacy of this approach, we provide an analysis of paths to various financial services IP addresses over the course of a month from a single BGP vantage point that quantifies the frequency of path alterations resulting in the traversal of new countries. We conclude with an argument for the utility of country-based egress policies that do not require the cooperation of upstream providers.
防火墙风景路由:通过政治和地理路由策略防止数据泄露
在本文中,我们描述了一个系统,该系统允许实时创建防火墙规则,以响应控制平面中的地理和政治变化。这允许组织通过分析边界网关协议(BGP)更新和阻止数据包通过有问题的管辖区路由来减轻数据泄露威胁。BGP参与者通过检查自治系统的路径并引用自治系统的外部数据源,可以推断出到达特定目的地址的流量将经过哪些国家。根据这些信息,组织可以在其出口流量上定义约束,以防止通过不受信任的区域发送敏感数据。鉴于目前发生的许多路由泄漏和BGP劫持,这为愿意接受降低可用性而不是机密性风险的组织提供了一个新的选择。与允许组织阻止来自特定国家的流量的防火墙类似,我们的方法允许阻止通过特定司法管辖区的出站流量。为了说明这种方法的有效性,我们从单个BGP有利位置对一个月内通往各种金融服务IP地址的路径进行了分析,该分析量化了导致穿越新国家的路径更改频率。最后,我们对不需要上游供应商合作的基于国家的出口政策的效用进行了论证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信