The Miner of Last Resort: Digital Currency, Shadow Money and the Role of the Central Bank

G. Steele
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Abstract

Cryptocurrency arose, and grew in popularity, following the financial crisis of 2008 built upon a promise of decentralizing money and payments. An examination of the history of money and banking the United States demonstrates that stable money benefits from strict controls and commitments by a centralized government through chartering restrictions and a broad safety net, rather than decentralization. In addition, financial crises happen when government allows money creation to occur outside of official channels. The U.S. central bank is then forced into a policy of supporting a range of money-like assets in order to maintain a grip on monetary policy and some semblance of financial stability. In addition, this chapter argues that cryptocurrency as a form of shadow money shares many of the problematic attributes of both the privately issued bank notes that created instability during the “free banking” era and the “shadow banking” activities that contributed to the 2008 crisis. In this sense, rather than being a novel and disruptive idea, cryptocurrency replicates many of the systemically destabilizing aspects of privately issued money and money-like instruments. This chapter proposes that, rather than allowing a new, digital “free banking” era to emerge, the better alternative is a public model. Specifically, it argues that the Federal Reserve should use its tools to improve public payment systems, enact robust utility-like regulations for private digital currencies, and limit the likelihood of bubbles using macroprudential measures.
最后的矿工:数字货币、影子货币和中央银行的角色
在2008年金融危机之后,基于货币和支付去中心化的承诺,加密货币出现并越来越受欢迎。对美国货币和银行业历史的研究表明,稳定的货币受益于中央政府通过特许限制和广泛的安全网进行的严格控制和承诺,而不是权力下放。此外,当政府允许在官方渠道之外创造货币时,金融危机就会发生。然后,美国中央银行被迫采取支持一系列货币类资产的政策,以保持对货币政策的控制和某种表面上的金融稳定。此外,本章还认为,加密货币作为影子货币的一种形式,与“自由银行”时代造成不稳定的私人发行的银行票据和导致2008年危机的“影子银行”活动具有许多问题属性。从这个意义上说,加密货币并不是一个新颖和颠覆性的想法,而是复制了私人发行的货币和货币类工具的许多系统性不稳定方面。本章提出,与其让一个新的数字“自由银行”时代出现,更好的选择是公共模式。具体来说,它认为美联储应该利用其工具来改善公共支付系统,为私人数字货币制定强有力的类似公用事业的法规,并使用宏观审慎措施来限制泡沫的可能性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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