{"title":"Populism, Group Thinking and Banking Policy","authors":"Federico Favaretto, D. Masciandaro","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3545223","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper builds a model of populism called Democratic Rioting in which citizens – i.e. the poor and the rich - are assumed to be heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics that result from banking shocks. We highlight a display of anger that is channelled through an election instead of in the streets. In turn the anger – a self-serving bias – can be influenced by non-financial news about immigration, welfare plans and housing plans. Therefore after a banking shock the consensus on a myopic populist policy can depend on many issues that have nothing to do with the bailout decision itself. We describe a mechanism that can be applied to the aftermath of both the Great Recession and the Great Depression.","PeriodicalId":344099,"journal":{"name":"ERN: Banking & Monetary Policy (Topic)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ERN: Banking & Monetary Policy (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3545223","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This paper builds a model of populism called Democratic Rioting in which citizens – i.e. the poor and the rich - are assumed to be heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics that result from banking shocks. We highlight a display of anger that is channelled through an election instead of in the streets. In turn the anger – a self-serving bias – can be influenced by non-financial news about immigration, welfare plans and housing plans. Therefore after a banking shock the consensus on a myopic populist policy can depend on many issues that have nothing to do with the bailout decision itself. We describe a mechanism that can be applied to the aftermath of both the Great Recession and the Great Depression.