Populism, Group Thinking and Banking Policy

Federico Favaretto, D. Masciandaro
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

This paper builds a model of populism called Democratic Rioting in which citizens – i.e. the poor and the rich - are assumed to be heavily influenced by psychological group dynamics that result from banking shocks. We highlight a display of anger that is channelled through an election instead of in the streets. In turn the anger – a self-serving bias – can be influenced by non-financial news about immigration, welfare plans and housing plans. Therefore after a banking shock the consensus on a myopic populist policy can depend on many issues that have nothing to do with the bailout decision itself. We describe a mechanism that can be applied to the aftermath of both the Great Recession and the Great Depression.
民粹主义、群体思维与银行政策
本文建立了一个民粹主义的模型,称为民主暴乱。在这个模型中,公民——即穷人和富人——被认为受到银行业冲击所导致的心理群体动力学的严重影响。我们强调通过选举而不是在街头表达愤怒。反过来,这种愤怒——一种自私自利的偏见——可能会受到有关移民、福利计划和住房计划的非金融新闻的影响。因此,在银行业受到冲击之后,关于短视的民粹主义政策的共识可能取决于许多与纾困决定本身无关的问题。我们描述了一种机制,可以应用于大衰退和大萧条的后果。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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