A Study on Leverage Buyout and Business Judgment Rule

J. Lim
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Abstract

Since the Supreme Court's conviction on collateral type Leveraged Buy-Out in 2010, There has been much debate about criminal sanctions over borrowing. LBO, a financial method of borrowing money from outside, has two aspects. One is to increase the efficiency of the target company's operation, and the other is that the buyer does not bear the risk arising from M&A process because the acquisition fund of the company's acquirer is transferred to the target company. In response, LBO is a simple financial technique that raises acquisition funds, and it is argued that it is not desirable to impose criminal sanctions to ensure management's creative activities because the risks arising in the process are general risks accompanying corporate activities. However, the core of criminal punishment for LBO is not the illegality of financial techniques that acquire and merge companies with other people's capital, but that it cannot be allowed to transfer loan to Target company in the M&A process. On the other hand, it is not reasonable to apply the crime of breach based on the trust relationship between the modern monarch and the lord to today's management activities. In addition, it is difficult to function as an entrepreneur's norm because the constituent requirements of the crime of breach are unclear. And management is bound to be very adventurous, but it is not reasonable to punish it criminally. However, while the crime of breach is applied to individual transactions, it is not equal to deny the crime of breach only for management activities. Breach is an efficient means in that it requires minimum ethics and order in company management. In addition, there is no reason to deny the application of breach of trust to LBO, considering that standards have been established to limit the constitutional requirements for breach of trust. The precedent also takes the position that whether or not LBO is guilty of breach of trust should be judged individually depending on whether the act meets the constituent requirements of breach of trust in the M&A process. However, in the judgment of LBO's breach of trust, the punishment is determined based on whether the company is damaged or not without a specific judgment on the violation of duty of care by management or intention. In other words, breach of trust is judged based on whether profits to offset losses are provided to the target company. There is a risk that this will not be interpreted as a crime without damage to the company. Therefore, it is desirable to judge the punishment for LBO in detail in connection with the constituent requirements of the crime of breach.
杠杆收购与企业判断规则研究
自2010年最高法院对抵押型杠杆收购(Leveraged Buy-Out)定罪以来,对借贷的刑事制裁一直存在很多争论。杠杆收购是一种向外部借款的金融方式,它有两个方面。一是提高目标公司的运营效率,二是由于公司收购者的收购资金转移到目标公司,买方不承担并购过程中产生的风险。作为回应,杠杆收购是一种筹集收购资金的简单金融技术,有人认为,为了确保管理层的创造性活动而施加刑事制裁是不可取的,因为在这一过程中产生的风险是伴随公司活动的一般风险。然而,对杠杆收购刑事处罚的核心并不是利用他人资金收购和合并公司的金融手法是否违法,而是在并购过程中不得将贷款转移给目标公司。另一方面,将建立在现代君主与领主信任关系基础上的失信罪适用于今天的管理活动也不合理。此外,违约罪的构成要件不明确,难以发挥企业家规范的作用。而管理必然是非常冒险的,但对其进行刑事处罚是不合理的。然而,虽然违约罪适用于个人交易,但不等于只对管理活动否认违约罪。违约是一种有效的手段,因为它对公司管理的道德和秩序要求最低。此外,考虑到已经建立了限制违反信托的宪法要求的标准,没有理由否认违反信托适用于杠杆收购。判例还认为,杠杆收购是否构成违约,应根据并购过程中是否符合违约构成要件来单独判断。然而,在对杠杆收购失信行为的判断中,处罚的依据是公司是否受到损害,而没有对管理层违反注意义务或故意的具体判断。换句话说,是否为目标公司提供利润来弥补损失是判断违约的依据。有一种风险是,在不损害公司的情况下,这不会被解释为犯罪。因此,应当结合违约罪的构成要件,对杠杆收购的处罚进行详细的判断。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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