Discovery of AI/ML Supply Chain Vulnerabilities within Automotive Cyber-Physical Systems

Daniel Williams, Chelece Clark, Rachel McGahan, Bradley Potteiger, Daniel Cohen, Patrick Musau
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Abstract

Steady advancement in Artificial Intelligence (AI) development over recent years has caused AI systems to become more readily adopted across industry and military use-cases globally. As powerful as these algorithms are, there are still gaping questions regarding their security and reliability. Beyond adversarial machine learning, software supply chain vulnerabilities and model backdoor injection exploits are emerging as potential threats to the physical safety of AI reliant CPS such as autonomous vehicles. In this work in progress paper, we introduce the concept of AI supply chain vulnerabilities with a provided proof of concept autonomous exploitation framework. We investigate the viability of algorithm backdoors and software third party library dependencies for applicability into modern AI attack kill chains. We leverage an autonomous vehicle case study for demonstrating the applicability of our offensive methodologies within a realistic AI CPS operating environment.
汽车网络物理系统中AI/ML供应链漏洞的发现
近年来,人工智能(AI)发展的稳步进步使得人工智能系统更容易在全球工业和军事用例中得到采用。尽管这些算法很强大,但它们的安全性和可靠性仍然存在一些悬而未决的问题。除了对抗性机器学习之外,软件供应链漏洞和模型后门注入漏洞正在成为依赖人工智能的CPS(如自动驾驶汽车)的物理安全的潜在威胁。在这篇正在进行的论文中,我们引入了人工智能供应链漏洞的概念,并提供了概念证明自主开发框架。我们研究了算法后门和软件第三方库依赖的可行性,以适用于现代人工智能攻击杀伤链。我们利用自动驾驶汽车案例研究来展示我们的进攻方法在现实的AI CPS操作环境中的适用性。
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