Protecting Unsophisticated Applicants in School Choice through Information Disclosure

Christian Basteck, M. Mantovani
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Unsophisticated applicants can be at a disadvantage under manipulable and hence strategically demanding school choice mechanisms. Disclosing information on applications in previous admission periods makes it easier to asses the chances of being admitted at a particular school, and hence may level the playing field between applicants who differ in their cognitive ability. We test this conjecture experimentally for the widely used Boston mechanism. Results show that, absent this information, there exist a substantial gap between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability, resulting in significant differences in payoffs, and ability segregation across schools. The treatment is effective in improving applicants’ strategic performance. However, because both lower and higher ability subjects improve when they have information about past demands, the gap between the two groups shrinks only marginally, and the instrument fails at levelling the playing field.
通过信息披露保护不成熟的申请人择校
不成熟的申请人在可操纵的、因此具有战略要求的择校机制下可能处于不利地位。在以前的录取期间披露申请信息,可以更容易地评估被某所学校录取的机会,因此可能会在认知能力不同的申请人之间提供公平的竞争环境。我们对广泛使用的波士顿机制进行了实验验证。结果表明,在缺乏这些信息的情况下,高、低认知能力的被试之间存在较大的差距,从而导致了显著的收益差异,出现了跨学校的能力隔离。这种待遇对提高应聘者的战略绩效是有效的。然而,由于能力较低和较高的受试者在了解了过去的需求信息后都会有所提高,两组之间的差距只会略微缩小,而且这种工具无法平衡竞争环境。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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