The Problem of Pure Negligence

Abstract

We are morally responsible, not just for what we do on purpose, but also in many cases for what we do unthinkingly. If I leave my skates on the sidewalk in the usual careless way and you trip and fall, I am responsible for my act and the resulting injury even if I did not mean to hurt you and would have never done what I did if I had stopped to think. This fact raises two connected questions. When exactly are we responsible for negligent wrongdoing, and why are we responsible under those conditions? I won’t give complete answers, but I do want to address a problem that arises as we think them through. As will emerge, certain dominant theories of responsibility imply that negligence is culpable only under certain highly restrictive conditions, whereas ordinary moral practice deems us culpable in a wider range of cases. This clash between theory and practice needs a response: one or the other needs adjustment. This chapter makes a preliminary case for revising practice to conform to theory.