Tripartite Evolutionary Game Study on Decision-making Behavior of Cooperative Development of Agricultural Operation Subjects

Runzhi Jia, Xiaohui Yu
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Abstract

How to give full play to the driving role of the new agricultural business entities to the small farmers, guide the small farmers into the modern agricultural development track, and realize the coordinated development of the agricultural business entities has become an urgent problem to be solved in the construction process of the new agricultural operation system. Therefore, based on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructed a three-party evolutionary game model of "government-new agricultural business entities - small farmers", and got the evolutionary and stable strategy of the three in different situations. And it studied how to promote the coordinated development of the three by Matlab numerical simulation. The results of the game show that: first of all, the decisions of the government, small farmers and new agricultural business entities are all influenced by the government itself and the other two parties, especially the government and small farmers' behavior choice is more sensitive. Second, if the three parties do not share the same direction of action, a series of guiding and supporting policies can still form a sound situation of common governance among the three parties. However, the decision-making of government guidance process has nothing to do with tax revenue and the rewards and punishments of the superior government. The guiding cost and loss of public credibility are the key factors that affect the choice of government behavior. Finally, as rational people, farmers will choose the strategy of "cooperation" only when they are satisfied that their income when participating in cooperation is higher than their own income when not participating in cooperation.
农业经营主体合作发展决策行为的三方进化博弈研究
如何充分发挥新型农业经营主体对小农的带动作用,引导小农步入现代农业发展轨道,实现农业经营主体的协调发展,成为新型农业经营体系建设过程中急需解决的问题。因此,本文基于进化博弈论,构建了“政府-新型农业经营主体-小农”三方进化博弈模型,得到了三方在不同情况下的进化稳定策略。并通过Matlab数值仿真研究了如何促进三者的协调发展。博弈结果表明:首先,政府、小农和新型农业经营主体的决策都受到政府自身和其他两方的影响,特别是政府和小农的行为选择更为敏感。第二,如果三方的行动方向不一致,通过一系列的引导和扶持政策,仍然可以形成三方共同治理的良好局面。然而,政府指导过程的决策与税收收入和上级政府的奖惩无关。引导成本和公信力的丧失是影响政府行为选择的关键因素。最后,作为理性的人,农民只有在满意自己参与合作时的收入高于自己不参与合作时的收入时,才会选择“合作”策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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