Australia

C. Leuprecht
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Abstract

Intelligence accountability in Australia balances compliance and bodies whose systematic focus is on efficacy and financial review with independent intelligence reviews, commissions, and inquiries that focus on efficacy. Australia differs insofar as it is not subject to a constitutionally or supranationally enshrined civil right regime. A diversity of mechanisms, ranging from parliamentary committees and executive bodies to periodic independent reviews, fashion an oversight system that drives innovation. From the three Royal Hope Commissions to regular inquiries into the National Intelligence Community, Australia’s independent in-depth periodic reviews, inquiries, and commissions have a track-record of shaping and spurring change and innovation in the scope and structure of accountability across its broader intelligence and security community. The Australian tradition of independent expert intelligence reviews, commissions, and inquiries offsets the lack of accountability bodies dedicated to reviewing for efficacy and innovation. The chapter reviews the member organizations of the Australia’s National Intelligence Community, the strategic environment that has informed intelligence and accountability in Australia, national security threats as seen by Australia, as well as Australia’s systematic approach to reviewing and innovating its intelligence accountability architecture. It consists of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and the Independent National Security Law Monitor. Although similar to the United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the United Kingdom’s Joint Intelligence Organization, Australia’s Office of National Intelligence is quite unique insofar as neither the US and UK equivalents nor comparable offices in Canada and the New Zealand have an analogous accountability function. These mechanisms balance existing independent review mechanisms with mandates to review legislation and compliance, propriety, administration.
澳大利亚
澳大利亚的情报问责制在合规性和机构之间取得平衡,这些机构的系统性重点是效率和财务审查,而独立的情报审查、委员会和调查的重点是效率。澳大利亚的不同之处在于,它不受宪法或超国家的公民权利制度的约束。从议会委员会和执行机构到定期独立审查,各种机制形成了一个推动创新的监督体系。从三个皇家希望委员会到对国家情报界的定期调查,澳大利亚的独立深入定期审查、调查和委员会在塑造和促进其更广泛的情报和安全社区责任范围和结构的变革和创新方面有着良好的记录。澳大利亚传统的独立专家情报审查、委员会和调查弥补了缺乏专门审查效率和创新的问责机构。本章回顾了澳大利亚国家情报界的成员组织,澳大利亚情报和问责制的战略环境,澳大利亚所看到的国家安全威胁,以及澳大利亚审查和创新其情报问责制架构的系统方法。它由情报和安全监察长、议会情报和安全联合委员会以及国家安全法独立监察员组成。虽然澳大利亚的国家情报办公室类似于美国的国家情报总监办公室和英国的联合情报组织,但它的独特之处在于,无论是美国和英国的同类机构,还是加拿大和新西兰的同类机构,都没有类似的问责职能。这些机制平衡了现有的独立审查机制与审查立法、合规性、适当性和行政的授权。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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