Obligation and Responsibility

Abstract

This chapter first exposes one substantial consequence of the obligation dilemma by introducing principles that forge putative connections between blameworthiness and impermissibility. The primary principles, or variations of them, are: (i) necessarily, one is blameworthy for doing something only if it is impermissible for one to do it; and (ii) necessarily, one is morally blameworthy for doing something only if one believes that it is morally impermissible for one to do it. If these principles are true, blameworthiness is imperiled if the obligation dilemma is sound. This initial discussion supports the thesis that factors that affect obligation may influence responsibility. The chapter then develops an interpretation of the view that factors that affect responsibility may impinge on obligation. Finally, some theses that link blameworthiness with desert, on the one hand, or sanction with desert, on the other, are addressed.