Key Issues Regarding the EU's Concurrent Imposition of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Chinese Coated Fine Papers: Analogue Country, Market Economy Treatment, Individual Treatment, and Double Remedy

Chien-Huei Wu
{"title":"Key Issues Regarding the EU's Concurrent Imposition of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Chinese Coated Fine Papers: Analogue Country, Market Economy Treatment, Individual Treatment, and Double Remedy","authors":"Chien-Huei Wu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2236657","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article uses the EU’s decision to simultaneously impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties against Chinese coated fine papers as a case study to illustrate the complexities involved in EU’s trade defense regime against products originating from non-market economies. Four specific issues are dealt with: analogue country, market economy treatment, individual treatment and double remedy. In examining the reasonableness of the European Commission’s choice of the analogue country, this article develops a two-step approach, firstly against the Basic AD Regulation and secondly against Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. In view of the positive results of the request for individual treatment, this article argues that the EU may pass the “as applied” complainant in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. With regard to the proposed amendment to the Basic AD Regulation, it may also pass the “as such” complaint. In view of the fact that the EU is a third party taking the same position as the respondent in US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, this article explores the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties since one single anti-dumping duty may provide sufficient level of protection. This article argues that the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties is mainly because of the perspective expiry of alternative price comparability methodology as provided in China’s accession protocol, the different nature of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, and practical benefits of concurrent imposition.","PeriodicalId":320446,"journal":{"name":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","volume":"9 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2015-03-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"LSN: Regional Arrangements (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2236657","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3

Abstract

This article uses the EU’s decision to simultaneously impose anti-dumping and countervailing duties against Chinese coated fine papers as a case study to illustrate the complexities involved in EU’s trade defense regime against products originating from non-market economies. Four specific issues are dealt with: analogue country, market economy treatment, individual treatment and double remedy. In examining the reasonableness of the European Commission’s choice of the analogue country, this article develops a two-step approach, firstly against the Basic AD Regulation and secondly against Article X:3 of the GATT 1994. In view of the positive results of the request for individual treatment, this article argues that the EU may pass the “as applied” complainant in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. With regard to the proposed amendment to the Basic AD Regulation, it may also pass the “as such” complaint. In view of the fact that the EU is a third party taking the same position as the respondent in US — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties, this article explores the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties since one single anti-dumping duty may provide sufficient level of protection. This article argues that the rationale behind the Commission’s determination to impose concurrent anti-dumping and countervailing duties is mainly because of the perspective expiry of alternative price comparability methodology as provided in China’s accession protocol, the different nature of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations, and practical benefits of concurrent imposition.
欧盟对中国铜版纸同时征收反倾销和反补贴税的关键问题:类比国、市场经济待遇、个别待遇和双重救济
本文以欧盟对中国铜版纸同时征收反倾销和反补贴税的决定为例,说明欧盟针对非市场经济体产品的贸易防御制度的复杂性。具体涉及四个问题:类似国家、市场经济待遇、个别待遇和双重救济。在审查欧洲委员会选择类似国家的合理性时,本文采用了两步方法,首先反对基本反倾销条例,其次反对1994年关贸总协定第X条第3款。鉴于个别待遇请求的积极效果,本文认为欧盟可以在WTO争端解决机制中通过“适用”申诉。就修订《反倾销基本规例》的建议,委员会亦可能会通过“如此”的投诉。鉴于欧盟是在美国反倾销和反补贴税中采取与被告相同立场的第三方,本文探讨了欧盟委员会决定同时征收反倾销和反补贴税的理由,因为单一的反倾销税可能提供足够的保护水平。本文认为,欧盟委员会决定同时征收反倾销和反补贴税的理由主要是由于中国加入议定书中规定的替代价格可比性方法的预期届满、反倾销和反补贴调查的不同性质以及同时征收的实际利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信