{"title":"Intelligent agents for negotiations in market games. II. Application [electricity supply]","authors":"V. Krishna, V. Ramesh","doi":"10.1109/PICA.1997.599431","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In competitive electricity markets, human decision-makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of. The authors present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts, and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt. The authors' negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory; however, it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential condition partners. In this paper, they apply it to power markets.","PeriodicalId":383749,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Power Industry Computer Applications","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Power Industry Computer Applications","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/PICA.1997.599431","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
In competitive electricity markets, human decision-makers need assistance to determine potential coalitions that they can be part of. The authors present an approach for designing specialized intelligent software agents that perform negotiations on behalf of their human counterparts, and then suggest market strategies that the human can adopt. The authors' negotiation protocol is derived from cooperative game theory; however, it differs from the game theory literature in requiring virtually no trustworthy information exchange between the potential condition partners. In this paper, they apply it to power markets.