ERAMO: Effective Remote Attestation through Memory Offloading

J. Østergaard, Edlira Dushku, N. Dragoni
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

Remote Attestation (RA) has gained a broad attention over recent years as an essential security mechanism that enables integrity verification of remote IoT devices. Typically, existing RA protocols aim at detecting malware presence in program memory. Recent RA schemes work towards attesting also data memory and focus mainly on detecting runtime attacks that manipulate stack pointers to hijack the execution flow of a running program. Despite different RA approaches, some data memory attacks still remain undetected. This paper proposes ERAMO, a novel RA protocol that investigates memory offloading technique in attesting broad memory regions of IoT devices. Instead of running a complex RA protocol on a resource-constrained IoT device, ERAMO leverages the emerging paradigm of Fog Computing to securely offload memory contents of IoT devices to nearby powerful devices. This approach aims at increasing the effectiveness of RA protocols by attesting larger data memory regions and allowing powerful devices to perform complex analysis of IoT devices’ state. We validate and evaluate ERAMO with a hardware proof-of-concept implementation using an ARM Cortex-M33 based microcontroller that provides ARM TrustZone to support secure isolation of the RA procedure. The conducted experiments confirm the feasibility of ERAMO and demonstrate that offloading technique increases the RA effectiveness in attesting dynamic memory regions.
ERAMO:通过内存卸载有效的远程认证
远程认证(RA)作为一种能够对远程物联网设备进行完整性验证的基本安全机制,近年来受到了广泛关注。通常,现有的RA协议旨在检测程序内存中的恶意软件。最近的RA方案也致力于验证数据内存,并主要关注于检测运行时攻击,这些攻击操纵堆栈指针来劫持正在运行的程序的执行流。尽管有不同的RA方法,一些数据内存攻击仍然未被发现。本文提出了一种新的RA协议ERAMO,该协议研究了在物联网设备的大内存区域验证中的内存卸载技术。ERAMO不是在资源受限的物联网设备上运行复杂的RA协议,而是利用新兴的雾计算范式,将物联网设备的内存内容安全地卸载到附近功能强大的设备上。这种方法旨在通过验证更大的数据存储区域来提高RA协议的有效性,并允许功能强大的设备对物联网设备的状态进行复杂的分析。我们使用基于ARM Cortex-M33的微控制器来验证和评估ERAMO的硬件概念验证实现,该微控制器提供ARM TrustZone以支持RA过程的安全隔离。实验证实了ERAMO的可行性,并表明卸载技术提高了RA在动态记忆区域验证中的有效性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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