James Longstreet and the Famous “Order to Attack”

Abstract

Gettysburg Magazine, no. 55 the turning point of the war. Following three days of confl ict, the Confederate retreat on July 4, 1863, marked the beginning of the end for Lee’s army. Th e Army of Northern Virginia never regained the prowess, strength, and eff ectiveness that it possessed immediately following its victory at Chancellorsville. In fact, the army never again entered Union territory, and Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House in April 1865 disbanded his army and eff ectively ended the American Civil War. Lee’s army lost the battle for a number of reasons, perhaps. However, one particular aspect of Gettysburg that has fostered much debate is the timing of Gen. James Longstreet’s July 2 attack on the Federal left . Some say Lee ordered Longstreet to attack at sunrise, while others argue Lee ordered Longstreet’s attack well into the morning. Underpinning this debate— which might otherwise appear a pedantic point devoid of practical consequence— is the historical inquiry concerning who remains responsible for the Confederate defeat on July 2. Th at is, the assignment of blame might shift from Longstreet to Lee, or vice versa, depending on the time at which Lee issued his attack orders to his subordinate, Longstreet. Many fi nd Longstreet at fault, while others blame Gen. J. E. B. Stuart and the absence of his cavalry as the primary reason. Moreover, some contend that General Lee’s wanting generalship was paramount to all other errors. Of course, it is also quite possible that there is plenty of blame to go around, with each candidate contributing, to diff erent degrees, to the Confederacy’s battlefi eld demise at Gettysburg. Upon review of offi cial records and numerous contemporaneous accounts, the historical record In the months leading to the Battle of Gettysburg, Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia enjoyed considerable success on the battlefi eld. In December 1862 Lee repelled the Federal assault at Fredericksburg in decisive fashion. Of Fredericksburg, one participant wrote that the Federal soldiers melted “like snow coming down on warm ground” as they rushed the wellfortifi ed Confederate line.1 A few months later, in April and May 1863, Lee’s army defeated the Army of the Potomac at Chancellorsville. Here, considered his greatest victory, Lee, outnumbered by two to one, delivered a crushing defeat to the betterequipped and bettersupplied enemy.2 With these victories in mind, an optimistic Lee, believing his army nearly invincible, planned his invasion.3 Intending to transfer hostilities to the North, free Virginia from enemy presence, break up the Federal’s summer campaign plan, and achieve a decisive Confederate victory on Union soil, Lee’s army crossed the Potomac in early June 1863.4 Upon locating the Federal army, Lee crossed his troops into Pennsylvania, hoping similar results awaited him. However, the Battle of Gettysburg proved to be