Nonlinear Pricing for Yield Management and Countering Strategic Consumer Behavior

M. Khouja, Yuefeng Li, Jing Zhou
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

Many models in operations management assume that faced with excess inventory, retailers offer price discounts to increase sales. This discount is assumed to be a certain dollar amount per unit or a certain percent of the regular price. However, many retailers use nonlinear pricing, e.g. "Buy one, get one for 50% off" and "Buy two, get the third free", which we refer to as BOGO. We analyze BOGO promotions within the newsvendor model framework and identify the reasons for its popularity among retailers. We describe the type of products for which BOGO promotions are suitable, identify the optimal BOGO discount, and its effect on the retailer's profit. We compare the BOGO promotions to the straight price reduction promotions and analyze the newsvendor's optimal choice between them. We also examine the two promotions in the presence of strategic consumers. We find that for reasonable values of consumer marginal utility and a given order quantity, BOGO reduces strategic consumers' chances of obtaining a unit at a discount and their incentive to wait. Therefore, the newsvendor orders a larger quantity with BOGO than with a straight price reduction. Thus, BOGO promotions can be used by the newsvendor to counter strategic consumer behavior. Also, we find that in the presence of strategic consumers, there are some cases where it is optimal for the retailer to wait and discount the product at the end of the season. However, with BOGO it is always optimal to offer the BOGO promotion at the start of the season when realized demand is low.
收益管理的非线性定价与对抗策略性消费者行为
运营管理中的许多模型假设,面对过剩的库存,零售商提供价格折扣以增加销售。这个折扣被假定为每件产品的一定金额或正常价格的一定百分比。然而,许多零售商使用非线性定价,例如:“买一送一,打五折”和“买二送三”,我们称之为“买一送一”。我们在报摊模型框架内分析了买一送一的促销活动,并确定了它在零售商中受欢迎的原因。我们描述了适合买一送一促销的产品类型,确定了最优的买一送一折扣,以及它对零售商利润的影响。我们比较了买一送一的促销和直接降价促销,并分析了报贩在两者之间的最优选择。我们还研究了两种促销在战略消费者的存在。我们发现,当消费者边际效用值合理且订单数量给定时,一送一赠降低了战略消费者以折扣获得单位的机会和等待的动机。因此,与直接降价相比,报贩用买一送一的方式订购了更多的数量。因此,报贩可以使用买一送一的促销来对抗战略性的消费者行为。此外,我们发现,在战略消费者存在的情况下,在某些情况下,零售商等待并在季末打折产品是最优的。然而,对于买一送一的促销活动,在赛季开始时,当实际需求较低时,提供买一送一的促销活动总是最佳的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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