Reflections on the justiciability of the "national security" clause as stipulated by section 18A of the Competition Act 89 of 1998: Lessons from Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit WTO Panel Decision

Simbarashe Tavuyanago, Clive Vinti
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Abstract

This article discusses the justiciability of the national security clause of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, which was introduced through recent amendments to the merger regulation framework The clause provides for the executive, through the establishment of a national security committee, to intervene in mergers which may pose a threat to national security interests of the country. The national security committee will have authority to determine whether a proposed merger may be approved, approved subject to conditions, or prohibited. International practice does permit national security concerns as one of the public interest considerations in the assessments of a merger involving a foreign firm. However, section 18A of the Competition Act fails to provide a clear guideline for recourse for parties to a merger that has been deemed to be in contravention of the provision. Consequently, this article assesses the justiciability of the national security clause in section 18A of the Competition Act by advancing the approach of the WTO Panel in Russia - Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit. In the light of this, it is our view that the decision of the national security committee to prohibit a merger based on national security interests could be challenged by an aggrieved party, even though the Act makes no provision for such a scenario on the grounds of the correlative principles of rule of law, legality and legal certainty, as well as the inherent jurisdiction of our higher (in relative terms) courts.
关于1998年第89号竞争法第18A条规定的“国家安全”条款可诉性的思考:俄罗斯的教训-关于过境交通的措施WTO专家组裁决
本文讨论了1998年第89号竞争法国家安全条款的可诉性,该条款是通过最近对合并监管框架的修订而引入的,该条款规定行政部门通过建立国家安全委员会来干预可能对国家安全利益构成威胁的合并。国家安全委员会将有权决定是否批准、有条件地批准或禁止拟议的合并。国际惯例确实允许在评估涉及外国公司的合并时将国家安全问题作为公共利益考虑之一。然而,《竞争法》第18A条未能为被视为违反该条款的合并各方的追索权提供明确的指导方针。因此,本文通过推进WTO俄罗斯专家组-关于过境交通的措施的方法来评估《竞争法》第18A条中国家安全条款的可诉性。有鉴于此,我们认为,国家安全委员会禁止基于国家安全利益的合并的决定可能会受到受害方的质疑,尽管该法案基于法治、合法性和法律确定性的相关原则,以及我们的高级法院(相对而言)的固有管辖权,没有对这种情况作出规定。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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