Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees
{"title":"Narrow Incumbent Victories and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines","authors":"Benjamin Crost, Joseph H. Felter, Hani Mansour, D. Rees","doi":"10.1093/wber/lhz014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.","PeriodicalId":129815,"journal":{"name":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Microeconomics: Welfare Economics & Collective Decision-Making eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz014","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
Post-election violence is a common form of conflict, but its underlying mechanisms are not well understood. Using data from the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections, this paper provides evidence that post-election violence is particularly intense after narrow victories by incumbents. Using a density test, the study shows that incumbents were substantially more likely to win narrow victories than their challengers, a pattern consistent with electoral manipulation. There is no evidence that the increase in post-election violence is related to the incumbents’ political platform or their performance in past elections. These results provide support for the notion that post-election violence is triggered by election fraud or by the failure of democratic ways of removing unpopular incumbents from office.