{"title":"What Really Matters in Auction Design","authors":"P. Klemperer","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.237114","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European \"third-generation\" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not \"one size fits all\".","PeriodicalId":415084,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","volume":"25 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2001-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1014","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Law: Finance & Corporate Governance Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237114","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1014
Abstract
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy - preventing collusive, predatory, and entry-deterring behaviour. Ascending and uniform-price auctions are particularly vulnerable to these problems. The Anglo-Dutch auction - a hybrid of the sealed-bid and ascending auctions - may perform better. Effective antitrust is also critical. Notable fiascoes in auctioning mobile-phone licenses, TV franchises, companies, electricity, etc., and especially the European "third-generation" (UMTS) spectrum auctions, show that everything depends on the details of the context. Auction design is not "one size fits all".