The Two Europes

Abstract

There are two Europes: a pair of political entities that occupy the same territory, have identical membership, share almost all the same rules, and yet are divided by radically different understandings of the point of the European project. The first Europe is a fledgling state, a federal construct in which the Member States are non-sovereign regions within the polity. This vision is exciting: a Europe that can become a superpower, a Europe capable of rivalling America and China. The second Europe is a confederation of states, an international construct under the control of its sovereign Member States. This vision is also exciting: a form of confederation deeper and richer than any other in the modern world, a new form of that polity, a political unit built on the agreement of its constituent parts rather than the absolutism of a state constitution. One of the reasons for the success of the European Union lies in the avoidance of resolving the disagreement between these two visions. There is a sort of constructive ambiguity, a Grand Bargain, that permits people who subscribe to each vision to work together – aware that their disagreement might, one day, need to be fought out, but also aware that there is a great deal to be gained by postponing that moment of choice. This chapter examines the two visions of Europe and illustrates the ways in which these rival visions were accommodated through constructive ambiguity. It then looks at the Draft Constitution and identifies the ways in which that document shifted the balance between these two visions, so challenging the compact on which the development of the Union had depended. The chapter concludes by drawing some very cautious and very weak connections between the Draft Constitution and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom. If the Draft Constitution was the zenith of the state-model of the Union, Brexit may be its nadir; a reaction, a terrible over-reaction, against the centralisation of constitutional power within the European project.