Insincerely Yours

C. Phelps, G. Madhavan
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Abstract

Every known voting method can be manipulated, hence the tactic of “strategic voting.” But some voting methods are harder to manipulate than others and therefore encourage “truthful revelation” of voters’ preferences. These interact with the problems that various voting systems have (following from Chapter 4) when voters are asked to choose between more than two options. Many organizations try to deal with the “problem” of many choices by breaking every decision down into a set of “yes/no” votes. The most famous of these “parliamentary process” procedures is Robert’s Rules of Order, widely used throughout the world. Controlling the sequence of “yes/no” votes can often manipulate the outcome, which is known in political science as “agenda control.” Other ways to manipulate outcomes includes how the choices are described (“framing” effects) and the biases (either explicit or implicit) of “decision facilitators.” This chapter discusses these issues and suggests ways to avoid their being used adversely in group decision-making.
你不诚实地
每一种已知的投票方式都可以被操纵,因此有了“战略投票”的策略。但有些投票方式比其他更难操纵,因此鼓励“真实披露”选民的偏好。当选民被要求在两个以上的选项中做出选择时,这些问题与各种投票系统所存在的问题相互作用(从第4章开始)。许多组织试图通过将每个决策分解为一组“是/否”的投票来处理许多选择的“问题”。这些“议会程序”程序中最著名的是在世界各地广泛使用的罗伯特议事规则。控制“是/否”投票的顺序通常可以操纵结果,这在政治学中被称为“议程控制”。其他操纵结果的方法包括如何描述选择(“框架”效应)和“决策促进者”的偏见(或显或隐)。本章讨论了这些问题,并提出了避免它们在群体决策中被不利使用的方法。
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