Game Analysis under Incomplete Information on Behaviors of All Stakeholders Relating to Land Acquisition of Large Infrastructure Project in China

Abstract

In the last few years, the increasing dispute of land acquisition in the construction process of large infrastructure project makes a tremendous impact on the project to be carried out smoothly and reduces social and economic performance of the project. With the help of game theory analysis, this paper explores the performance of all interest parties relating to land acquisition of large infrastructure project, in which the interest preference of parties concerned, and characteristics of behavior are comprehensively studied. Based on it, two game models are established: the bargaining game under incomplete information between local government and peasantry, the game model based on principal-agent relationship between central government and local government. Interactions among central government, local government and peasantry are illustrated in analysis of the two models. In the end, some proposals are put forward for central government's decision on land acquisition of large infrastructure project