The Effect of Agency Theory upon Cost Stickiness

Hagar Ahmed Fouad Abdeltawab
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Abstract

The main purpose of the research was to examine the effect of agency problem on cost stickiness, the results revealed that cost exhibits an asymmetric behavior which contradicts the traditional cost assumption, further, agency theory plays a vital role in determining the asymmetric cost behavior through two drivers; empire building incentives that make managers increasing the acquisition of resources when demand increases and keeping unused resources when demand drops in order to chaise their personal benefits resulting in cost stickiness, also, earnings management incentives that make managers delaying the acquisition of needed resources when demand increases and cutting unused resources aggressively when demand declines in order to meet earnings target resulting in a lower degree of cost stickiness
代理理论对成本粘性的影响
研究的主要目的是考察代理问题对成本粘性的影响,结果表明成本表现出不对称行为,这与传统的成本假设相矛盾,代理理论通过两个驱动因素在决定成本不对称行为中起着至关重要的作用;帝国建设激励是指管理者在需求增加时增加获取资源,在需求下降时保留未使用的资源,以谋取个人利益,从而导致成本粘性;盈余管理激励是指管理者在需求增加时推迟获取所需资源,在需求下降时积极削减未使用的资源,以达到盈余目标,从而降低成本粘性
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