Playing the Advantage Card: Shared Knowledge of Favorable Negotiation Asymmetries and Effects on Early Concessions

Abstract

How do negotiators react when they have one of two types of favorable asymmetry? A laboratory study examined the effects of having helpful inside information, favorable Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (BATNA), or neither on the magnitude of negotiator concessions during the early part of a negotiation. Participants (N = 158) were randomly assigned to either a favorable inside information or BATNA asymmetry or a symmetric condition to test directly whether different types of asymmetries (inside information and BATNA) only exert effects on yielding when others' knowledge of the asymmetry is consistent with operation of that asymmetry. Results indicated that when participants believed others were aware of their favorable asymmetry, BATNA exerted an effect on yielding, whereas when participants believed others were not aware of their favorable asymmetry, inside information affected yielding. Implications for negotiation theory and research are discussed.