The Corporate Governance of Privately Controlled Brazilian Firms (A Governança Corporativa Das Empresas Brasileiras Com Controle Privado Nacional)

Bernard Black, A. de Carvalho, Érica Gorga
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

We provide an overview of the corporate governance practices of Brazilian public companies, based primarily on an extensive 2005 survey of 116 companies. We focus on the 88 responding Brazilian private firms which are not majority owned by the state or a foreign company. We identify areas where Brazilian corporate governance is relatively strong and weak. Board independence is an area of weakness: The boards of most Brazilian private firms are comprised entirely or almost entirely of insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. Many firms have zero independent directors. At the same time, minority shareholders have legal rights to representation on the boards of many firms, and this representation is reasonably common. Financial disclosure lags behind world standards. Only a minority of firms provide a statement of cash flows or consolidated financial statements. However, many provide English language financial statements, and an English language version of their website. Audit committees are uncommon, but many Brazilian firms use an alternate approach to ensuring financial statement accuracy – establishing a fiscal board. A minority of firms provide takeout rights to minority shareholders on a sale of control. Controlling shareholders often use shareholders agreements to ensure control. Este artigo apresenta um panorama das praticas de governanca corporativa no Brasil, baseado em um extenso levantamento feito no ano de 2005 com 88 empresas com controle privado nacional. Identificamos areas onde a governanca corporativa no Brasil e relativamente forte ou fraca. Os conselhos de administracao da maioria das empresas privadas brasileiras sao compostos totalmente ou quase totalmente por membros ou representantes da familia ou grupo controlador. Muitas empresas nao tem nenhum conselheiro independente. Ao mesmo tempo, acionistas minoritarios tem direitos legais de representacao no conselho de administracao de muitas empresas e tal representacao e razoavelmente comum. Divulgacoes de informacoes financeiras estao aquem dos padroes internacionais. Apenas algumas empresas fornecem informacoes sobre os fluxos de caixa ou demonstracoes financeiras consolidadas. Entretanto, muitas empresas fornecem suas demonstracoes financeiras em ingles em suas paginas de internet. Comites de auditoria nao sao comuns, porem muitas empresas brasileiras buscam uma alternativa para assegurar a precisao das demonstracoes financeiras, por meio da criacao de um conselho fiscal. Uma pequena parte fornece direitos de protecao para os acionistas minoritarios em uma venda de controle da empresa. Os acionistas que detem o controle da empresa costumam utilizar os acordos de acionistas para garantir o controle. This document is in Portuguese. The English language version is available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003059 For a shorter English version, intended for a non-Brazilian audience, see Black, de Carvalho and Gorga, Corporate Governance in Brazil, Emerging Markets Review, vol. 10, (2009) (nearly final version available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152454)
巴西私人控制公司的公司治理(巴西国家私人控制公司的公司治理)
我们主要基于2005年对116家公司的广泛调查,概述了巴西上市公司的公司治理实践。我们重点关注88家巴西私营企业,这些企业并非由国家或外国公司持有多数股权。我们确定了巴西公司治理相对较强和较弱的领域。董事会独立性是一个薄弱环节:大多数巴西私营公司的董事会全部或几乎全部由内部人士或控股家族或集团的代表组成。许多公司没有独立董事。与此同时,少数股东在许多公司的董事会中拥有合法的代表权,这种代表权相当普遍。财务披露落后于世界标准。只有少数公司提供现金流量表或合并财务报表。然而,许多公司提供英文财务报表,以及其网站的英文版本。审计委员会并不常见,但许多巴西公司使用另一种方法来确保财务报表的准确性-建立一个财政委员会。少数公司通过出售控制权向少数股东提供外卖权。控股股东通常使用股东协议来确保控制权。巴西企业治理实践概况,巴西企业治理实践概况,巴西企业治理实践概况,巴西企业治理实践概况,巴西企业治理,巴西企业治理,巴西企业治理,巴西企业治理,巴西企业治理。在巴西,政府和企业之间的关系是一个明确的领域。多数行政管理委员会、私人委员会、巴西委员会、综合委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会、全体委员会。Muitas体现了一种全新的精神,一种独立的精神。少数民族行动派和少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派、少数民族行动派。泄露信息和财务信息的行为是一种国际行为。Apenas算法表达了财务信息的变化,也表达了财务信息的整合。此外,muitas还展示了金融行业的发展趋势,就像互联网行业一样。国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会、国家审计委员会。在保护少数民族的行动主义者和少数民族的行动主义者的情况下,没有人能控制他们。所有的行动主义者都有控制数据的决心,而他们的习惯则是行动主义者的共识,而不是控制。这份文件是葡萄牙文的。英文版本可在http://ssrn.com/abstract=1003059找到。针对非巴西读者的简短英文版本,见Black、de Carvalho和Gorga,《巴西的公司治理》,新兴市场评论,第10卷,(2009)(最终版本可在http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152454找到)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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