Update on Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace Process

Abstract

There were a number of new developments in Myanmar’s ethnic peace process since the last Panglong Peace Conference in July 2018. The first of these was a unilateral ceasefire declaration by the military for its north, northeast and southern commands for a period of 4 months from January to April 2019. According to the military this announcement was meant to facilitate the peace process in order to try and end armed conflict in the country by 2020 and in time for the next election. However, this announcement had little impact on Rakhine state in the west where attempts by the Arakan Army (AA) to establish a foothold in the state has led to a serious surge in fighting as well as new groups of internally displaced persons. This new front has now become the most volatile region in the country and adds on to a list of grievances between Rakhine nationalists in the state on the one hand and the central government and the military on the other. Another major development has been attempts by the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led parliament to amend the constitution, much to the chagrin of the military that has stoutly opposed it thus far. This article examines the most important developments that have occurred in Myanmar’s ethnic peace process since the Third 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference that was held in August 2018. Specifically it examines the military’s unilateral ceasefire that was declared in January 2019, and the upsurge of violence in Rakhine state since then. Then it goes on to look at the Karen National Union’s withdrawal from formal meetings of the peace process since last October and the chances of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) possibly signing on to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the footsteps of the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the Lahu Democratic Union (LDU). The fourth section outlines the continued fighting in the Shan states between the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) on the one hand and the Restoration Council of the Shan States (RCSS) and the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) on the other that has continued unabated with a seeming dynamic of its own. The fifth section looks at continued Chinese attempts to broker peace between the Northern Alliance and the government while the final section examines the dynamics associated with the NLD-led parliament’s attempts to amend the 2008 Constitution that has put it on a seeming collision course with the military. The concluding section then describes the likely future issues and trajectories in the peace process.