{"title":"Conceptual Envelopment","authors":"David J. Kilcullen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190265687.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter discusses China’s evolution and adaptation since the Cold War, surveys the evolution of Chinese forces, offers case studies of the Sino-Vietnamese War and the South China Sea, introduces and analyzes the concept of conceptual envelopment as it relates to China, discusses the transformative effect of China’s emergence as a global oceanic and maritime power, and explores the concept of unrestricted warfare and China’s Three Warfares doctrine. It argues that, in the quarter century since 1993, China has learned by watching the West struggle in the post-Cold War era, and has taken advantage of Western preoccupation with terrorism since 2001. The 1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade prompted strategists in Beijing to shift from a peacetime, concept-led adaptation process to a wartime, reactive approach that treats the United States as a “pacing threat.”","PeriodicalId":131434,"journal":{"name":"The Dragons and the Snakes","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-03-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Dragons and the Snakes","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190265687.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter discusses China’s evolution and adaptation since the Cold War, surveys the evolution of Chinese forces, offers case studies of the Sino-Vietnamese War and the South China Sea, introduces and analyzes the concept of conceptual envelopment as it relates to China, discusses the transformative effect of China’s emergence as a global oceanic and maritime power, and explores the concept of unrestricted warfare and China’s Three Warfares doctrine. It argues that, in the quarter century since 1993, China has learned by watching the West struggle in the post-Cold War era, and has taken advantage of Western preoccupation with terrorism since 2001. The 1991 Gulf War, the 1996 Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade prompted strategists in Beijing to shift from a peacetime, concept-led adaptation process to a wartime, reactive approach that treats the United States as a “pacing threat.”