Dynamic Resource Allocation for Hierarchical Federated Learning

Wei Yang Bryan Lim, Jer Shyuan Ng, Zehui Xiong, D. Niyato, Song Guo, Cyril Leung, C. Miao
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引用次数: 4

Abstract

One of the enabling technologies of Edge Intelligence is the privacy preserving machine learning paradigm called Federated Learning (FL). However, communication inefficiency remains a key bottleneck in FL. To reduce node failures and device dropouts, the Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL) framework has been proposed whereby cluster heads are designated to support the data owners through intermediate model aggregation. This decentralized learning approach reduces the reliance on a central controller, e.g., the model owner. However, the issues of resource allocation and incentive design are not well-studied in the HFL framework. In this paper, we consider a two-level resource allocation and incentive mechanism design problem. In the lower level, the cluster heads offer rewards in exchange of the data owners’ participation, and the data owners are free to choose among any clusters to join. Specifically, we apply the evolutionary game theory to model the dynamics of the cluster selection process. In the upper level, given that each cluster head can choose to serve a model owner, the model owners have to compete for the services of the cluster head. As such, we propose a deep learning based auction mechanism to derive the valuation of each cluster head’s services. The performance evaluation shows the uniqueness and stability of our proposed evolutionary game, as well as the revenue maximizing property of the deep learning based auction.
分层联邦学习的动态资源分配
边缘智能的使能技术之一是隐私保护机器学习范式,称为联邦学习(FL)。然而,通信效率低下仍然是FL的关键瓶颈。为了减少节点故障和设备丢失,提出了分层联邦学习(HFL)框架,其中指定簇头通过中间模型聚合来支持数据所有者。这种分散的学习方法减少了对中央控制器(例如模型所有者)的依赖。然而,在HFL框架下,资源配置和激励设计问题并没有得到很好的研究。本文考虑一个两级资源配置和激励机制设计问题。在较低级别,集群头提供奖励以交换数据所有者的参与,并且数据所有者可以自由选择加入的任何集群。具体来说,我们应用进化博弈论来模拟集群选择过程的动力学。在上层,假设每个簇头可以选择为一个模型所有者服务,模型所有者必须竞争簇头的服务。因此,我们提出了一种基于深度学习的拍卖机制来获得每个集群头部服务的估值。性能评估显示了我们提出的进化博弈的唯一性和稳定性,以及基于深度学习的拍卖的收益最大化属性。
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