Self-Determination: What Lessons from Kashmir?

Ishita Chakrabarty
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Abstract

This Article takes the example of Kashmir as a longstanding dispute, to illustrate the complexity that is self-determination. The Article shows that even massive human rights violations coupled with seizure of a sub-State group’s right to autonomy may not be enough. The international community appears to be wary of taking a stand on a sub-State group’s right to self-determination because of apprehensions that they may pass into norms, for it is in the interest of every state that their territorial integrity is not permanently altered through the exercise of external self-determination. The success of a sub-State group’s legitimate claims has always been preceded either by coercive military (e.g., Kosovo, Bangladesh) or non-military interventions (e.g., East Timor). In invoking the Responsibility to Protect and the growing importance of the human rights framework, this Article attempts to show that the international community must reassess its stand. * Ishita Chakrabarty received her BA LL.B (Hons.) from Hidayatullah National Law University. She is currently engaged in the role of Research Officer at Quill Foundation, New Delhi, India, where she works over matters related to citizenship, counter-terrorism and minority rights. Her area of interests include refugee laws and international humanitarian law. The Author wishes to thank Ariel Lynn Anderson and the entire editorial team at Indiana International and Comparative Law Review for their support. All errors are the Author’s own. The Author can be contacted at: ishita.chakrabarty24@gmail.com. 36 INDIANA INT’L & COMP. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:35 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION I. FROM 1947 TO 2019: A HISTORY OF THE KASHMIRI STRUGGLE A. Kashmir as a Contested Territory between India and Pakistan B. Kashmir as an Autonomous Unit within the Indian Constitution II. THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION III. WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR KASHMIR? IV. SELF-DETERMINATION: A HOLLOW ‘RIGHT’? CONCLUSION
自决:克什米尔有什么教训?
本文以长期争端的克什米尔为例,说明自决的复杂性。该条表明,即使大规模侵犯人权,加上剥夺一个次级国家集团的自治权,也可能是不够的。国际社会似乎对对一个次级国家集团的自决权采取立场持谨慎态度,因为担心这些权利可能会成为规范,因为不通过行使外部自决而永久改变其领土完整符合每个国家的利益。在次级国家集团的合法主张取得成功之前,总是先有强制性军事干预(如科索沃、孟加拉国)或非军事干预(如东帝汶)。在援引“保护的责任”和人权框架日益增长的重要性时,该条试图表明,国际社会必须重新评估其立场。* Ishita Chakrabarty获得学士学位。希达亚图拉国立法律大学荣誉学士学位。她目前在印度新德里的Quill基金会担任研究官员,研究与公民身份、反恐和少数民族权利有关的问题。她的研究领域包括难民法和国际人道主义法。作者谨感谢阿里尔·林恩·安德森和《印第安纳国际与比较法评论》的整个编辑团队的支持。所有的错误是作者自己的。可通过ishita.chakrabarty24@gmail.com与作者联系。1 .从1947年到2019年:克什米尔斗争的历史A.克什米尔作为印度和巴基斯坦之间的争议领土B.克什米尔作为印度宪法内的自治单位2。三、自决权。这对克什米尔意味着什么?自决:一种空洞的“权利”?结论
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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