The Limits of Legal Evolution: Knowledge and Normativity in Theories of Legal Change

Liam McHugh-Russell
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Abstract

Over the last forty years, legal theory and policy advice have come to draw heavily from an ‘evolutionary’ jurisprudence that explains legal transformation by drawing inspiration from the theoretical successes of Darwinian natural selection. This project seeks to enrich and critique this tradition using an analytical perspective that emphasizes the material consequences of concepts and ideas. Existing theories of legal evolution depend on a positivist epistemology that strictly distinguishes the objects of social life — interests, institutions, systems — from knowledge about those objects. My dissertation explores how knowledge, and especially non-legal expertise, acts as an independent site and locus of transformation, mediating the interaction between law and social phenomena and acting as a catalyst of legal innovation. Prior work by Simon Deakin has integrated insights from systems theory to show how the interaction between law and economic institutions can only be properly understood by attending to the epistemic frame law uses to interpret economic practice. Using a case study on the impact of ‘law and finance’ literature on World Bank policy advice and, consequentially, on legal reforms adopted by many developing countries between 2000 and the present, I show that such attention to legal knowledge is inadequate. The case points, first, to the contingency of the intellectual tools used to understand legal institutions. Rather than deploying a determinate rationality, private and public actors address legal, economic, and ethical problems using a variety of paradigms: viewpoints are not determined by realities. More fundamentally, the cases suggest that successful paradigms, rather than economic or political realities alone, shape the dynamics of socio-legal change. My conclusions address some normative questions that arise when researchers in a social scientific mode are implicated in the processes they seek to document.
法律演化的极限:法律变迁理论中的知识与规范
在过去的四十年里,法律理论和政策建议已经大量地从“进化”法理学中汲取灵感,通过从达尔文自然选择的理论成功中汲取灵感来解释法律转型。这个项目试图用分析的角度来丰富和批判这一传统,强调概念和思想的物质后果。现有的法律进化理论依赖于一种实证主义认识论,这种认识论严格区分社会生活的对象——利益、制度、系统——与关于这些对象的知识。我的论文探讨了知识,特别是非法律专业知识,如何作为一个独立的场所和转化的轨迹,调解法律和社会现象之间的相互作用,并作为法律创新的催化剂。西蒙·迪肯(Simon Deakin)先前的工作整合了系统理论的见解,表明法律与经济制度之间的相互作用如何只能通过关注法律用于解释经济实践的认知框架来正确理解。通过对“法律与金融”文献对世界银行政策建议的影响的案例研究,以及对2000年至今许多发展中国家采取的法律改革的影响,我表明,对法律知识的这种关注是不够的。首先,这个案例指出了用来理解法律制度的智力工具的偶然性。私人和公共行为者不是采用一种确定的理性,而是使用各种范式来解决法律、经济和道德问题:观点不是由现实决定的。更根本的是,这些案例表明,成功的范例,而不仅仅是经济或政治现实,塑造了社会法律变革的动力。我的结论解决了一些规范性问题,当社会科学模式的研究人员卷入他们试图记录的过程时,这些问题就会出现。
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