9. Constitutionalizing the Power of Those Who Do Not Rule

Abstract

This chapter contributes to plebeian constitutional theory by proposing to constitutionalize popular power in a “plebeian branch” that is thought through Hannah Arendt's model of parties and councils, incorporating features from the proposals that established plebeian institutions. It lays out a way to separate the few from the many that would in principle conform to the current liberal constitutional framework. It also describes institutions that would make up the proposed plebeian branch, such as a network of primary assemblies with the power to initiate and veto or repeal any law, public policy, judicial decision, and appointment as well as to update the constitution. The chapter offers a tentative juridical framework for the plebeian branch, which is meant to be incorporated into any existing representative democratic regime and is aimed at empowering plebeians. It suggests a more enduring solution to the systemic corruption of representative systems and the oligarchic domination that inevitably comes with it.