Samanvaya Agarwal, Saipriya Kamath, K. Subramanian, Prasanna Tantri
{"title":"Board Conduct in Banks","authors":"Samanvaya Agarwal, Saipriya Kamath, K. Subramanian, Prasanna Tantri","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3822953","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine private and confidential minutes of board meetings of a majority of Indian banks, and offer insights into the issues tabled and discussed in bank boards. We find that risk issues account for only 10% of the issues tabled with regulation and compliance accounting for the most (41%) followed by business strategy (31%). Only 18% of the issues are deliberated in detail. Examining the minutes of risk management committee meetings, we find that only 31% of the issues tabled are forward-looking. Using a simple model, we infer that bank boards under-invest in risk and over-invest in regulation and compliance.","PeriodicalId":168140,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Internal Governance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3822953","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
We examine private and confidential minutes of board meetings of a majority of Indian banks, and offer insights into the issues tabled and discussed in bank boards. We find that risk issues account for only 10% of the issues tabled with regulation and compliance accounting for the most (41%) followed by business strategy (31%). Only 18% of the issues are deliberated in detail. Examining the minutes of risk management committee meetings, we find that only 31% of the issues tabled are forward-looking. Using a simple model, we infer that bank boards under-invest in risk and over-invest in regulation and compliance.