On the Behaviour and Determinants of Risk-Based Capital Ratios: Revisiting the Evidence from UK Banking Institutions

W. Francis, M. Osborne
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引用次数: 23

Abstract

Using bank-level panel data from the United Kingdom, this paper investigates the factors that influence banking institutions' choice of risk-based capital ratios. Special focus is placed on evaluating whether and how institutions respond to changes in regulatory capital requirements and if these responses vary across the economic cycle. This issue is of particular interest to policymakers that rely on capital regulation in conjunction with other supervisory tools to affect bank behaviours and maintain market confidence and financial stability more broadly. The paper also explores the extent to which UK banks’ capital management practices were procyclical under Basel I. Understanding whether such practices existed under this less risk-sensitive (and potentially, less procyclical) regulatory capital regime is a useful first step towards determining if banks, in their capital management practices, consider swings in economic conditions on their capital positions and lending capacities, which may, in turn, impact on the severity and duration of such economic cycles.We find a statistically significant association between banks' risk-based capital ratios and individual capital requirements set by regulators in the UK. We also find that the rate at which banks respond to changing capital requirements depends significantly on certain characteristics of the bank (e.g., size, exposure to market discipline, nearness to regulatory threshold) as well as the direction of the economic cycle. We find a (marginally statistically significant) negative association between capital ratios and the economic cycle, but no association when we focus only on the largest banks in the UK, suggesting that systemically important banks tend to maintain risk-based capital ratios over the cycle (although we note that this finding is based on a sample period which does not contain a significant downturn). Further, we note a positive association between capital ratios and capital quality, suggesting that reliance on capital with relatively higher adjustment costs (e.g., tier 1 capital) may raise the profile of that consideration in capital management practices and lead cost-minimizing banks to maintain higher total risk-based capital ratios overall. Finally, we find a positive marginal effect of market discipline on total risk-based capital ratios held by UK banks. We interpret this result as suggesting that banks mitigate expected market reactions (e.g., on their funding costs or ability to access certain capital markets activities) to their business decisions by holding higher capital ratios.
基于风险的资本比率的行为和决定因素:重新审视来自英国银行机构的证据
本文利用来自英国的银行层面的面板数据,研究了影响银行机构选择基于风险的资本比率的因素。特别侧重于评估机构是否以及如何应对监管资本要求的变化,以及这些反应是否在整个经济周期中有所不同。对于那些依赖资本监管和其他监管工具来影响银行行为、在更大范围内维护市场信心和金融稳定的政策制定者来说,这个问题尤为重要。本文还探讨了在巴塞尔协议i下,英国银行的资本管理实践在多大程度上是顺周期的。了解在这种风险敏感性较低的(潜在的,顺周期较低的)监管资本制度下是否存在此类实践,是确定银行在其资本管理实践中是否考虑经济状况对其资本状况和贷款能力的波动的有用的第一步。对这种经济周期的严重程度和持续时间的影响。我们发现银行基于风险的资本比率与英国监管机构设定的个人资本要求之间存在统计学上显著的关联。我们还发现,银行对不断变化的资本要求做出反应的速度在很大程度上取决于银行的某些特征(例如,规模、对市场纪律的敞口、接近监管门槛的程度)以及经济周期的方向。我们发现资本比率与经济周期之间存在(统计学上显著的)负相关,但当我们只关注英国最大的银行时,没有关联,这表明具有系统重要性的银行倾向于在周期内保持基于风险的资本比率(尽管我们注意到这一发现是基于不包含显著低迷的样本时期)。此外,我们注意到资本比率与资本质量之间存在正相关关系,这表明对调整成本相对较高的资本(例如,一级资本)的依赖可能会提高资本管理实践中这一考虑的形象,并导致成本最小化的银行总体上保持较高的基于风险的总资本比率。最后,我们发现市场纪律对英国银行持有的基于风险的总资本比率具有正的边际效应。我们将这一结果解释为,银行通过持有更高的资本比率,减轻了预期的市场反应(例如,对其融资成本或参与某些资本市场活动的能力)对其业务决策的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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