The Relation between Monetary and Macroprudential Policy

Abstract

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies with different levels of cooperation among policy authorities: non-cooperation, full cooperation, and leader-follower relation. In non-cooperation, each policy authority’s optimal response is to tighten its policy measures when the inflation gap, the output gap and the credit gap expand, and when other authorities’ policy measures are loosened. This indicates that the two policies are substitutes for each other. The condition for the response functions to converge to a Nash equilibrium and the speed of convergence depend on the authorities’ preferences and the economic structure. If the financial supervisory authority (FSA) puts greater importance on the output gap, the probability of non-convergence increases and the speed of convergence declines even when the condition of convergence is satisfied. When the policy authorities fully cooperate with each other, they can establish an optimal combination of policy responses to each of the three gaps.