Yuchen Duan, Quan Chen, Qian Zhang, Changbao Zheng, Qile Zheng, Long Cheng
{"title":"Identification and Prevention of Collusion among Power Producers in Power Market Based on Decision Tree","authors":"Yuchen Duan, Quan Chen, Qian Zhang, Changbao Zheng, Qile Zheng, Long Cheng","doi":"10.1109/FES57669.2023.10183256","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The oligopoly nature of the power market leads to the existence of tacit collusion among power producers. The problem of collusion has seriously affected the fairness, competitiveness and effectiveness of the market. For this kind of problem, most predecessors have carried out theoretical research and put forward the causes of collusion and some prevention methods. However, tacit collusion is highly hidden and can be realized in many forms, which is difficult to judge and identify. Starting from the data, this paper finds out the power producers who may have collusion through mathematical methods, and then strictly “takes care of” such power producers. In the new energy power market, it is found that the collusion problem still exists in the new energy power market through modeling and analysis, and the collusion behavior of power producers in the power market is screened through the decision tree classification algorithm, The decision tree algorithm has a very obvious effect on the collusion analysis of power producers in the power market. Finally, some suggestions on the prevention of collusion are put forward.","PeriodicalId":165790,"journal":{"name":"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)","volume":"24 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FES57669.2023.10183256","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The oligopoly nature of the power market leads to the existence of tacit collusion among power producers. The problem of collusion has seriously affected the fairness, competitiveness and effectiveness of the market. For this kind of problem, most predecessors have carried out theoretical research and put forward the causes of collusion and some prevention methods. However, tacit collusion is highly hidden and can be realized in many forms, which is difficult to judge and identify. Starting from the data, this paper finds out the power producers who may have collusion through mathematical methods, and then strictly “takes care of” such power producers. In the new energy power market, it is found that the collusion problem still exists in the new energy power market through modeling and analysis, and the collusion behavior of power producers in the power market is screened through the decision tree classification algorithm, The decision tree algorithm has a very obvious effect on the collusion analysis of power producers in the power market. Finally, some suggestions on the prevention of collusion are put forward.