Profiling high-school students with facebook: how online privacy laws can actually increase minors' risk

Ratan Dey, Yuan Ding, K. Ross
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引用次数: 21

Abstract

Lawmakers, children's advocacy groups and modern society at large recognize the importance of protecting the Internet privacy of minors (under 18 years of age). Online Social Networks, in particular, take precautions to prevent third parties from using their services to discover and profile minors. These precautions include displaying only minimal information in registered minors' public profiles, not listing minors when searching for users by high school or city, and banning young children from joining altogether. In this paper we show how an attacker can circumvent these precautions. We develop efficient crawling and data mining methodologies to discover and profile most of the high school students in a targeted high school. In particular, using Facebook and for a given target high school, the methodology finds most of the students in the school, and for each discovered student infers a profile that includes significantly more information than is available in a registered minor's public profile. Such profiles can be used for many nefarious purposes, including selling the profiles to data brokers, large-scale automated spear-phishing attacks on minors, as well as physical safety attacks such as stalking, kidnapping and arranging meetings for sexual abuse. Ironically, the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), a law designed to protect the privacy of children, indirectly facilitates the approach. In order to bypass restrictions put in place due to the COPPA law, some children lie about their ages when registering, which not only increases the exposure for themselves but also for their non-lying friends. Our analysis strongly suggests there would be significantly less privacy leakage if Facebook did not have age restrictions.
用facebook分析高中生:网络隐私法实际上如何增加未成年人的风险
立法者、儿童权益组织和整个现代社会都认识到保护未成年人(18岁以下)网络隐私的重要性。特别是在线社交网络,采取预防措施防止第三方使用其服务来发现和分析未成年人。这些预防措施包括在已注册未成年人的公开档案中只显示最少的信息,在按高中或城市搜索用户时不列出未成年人,以及完全禁止年幼的儿童加入。在本文中,我们将展示攻击者如何绕过这些预防措施。我们开发了高效的爬行和数据挖掘方法来发现和分析目标高中的大多数高中生。特别是,使用Facebook并针对给定的目标高中,该方法找到了学校的大多数学生,并为每个发现的学生推断出一个包含比注册未成年人的公开个人资料多得多的信息的个人资料。这些个人资料可以用于许多邪恶的目的,包括将个人资料出售给数据经纪人,对未成年人进行大规模自动鱼叉式网络钓鱼攻击,以及诸如跟踪、绑架和安排性虐待会议等人身安全攻击。具有讽刺意味的是,旨在保护儿童隐私的《儿童在线隐私保护法》(COPPA)间接促进了这种做法。为了绕过COPPA法律的限制,一些孩子在注册时谎报年龄,这不仅增加了他们自己的曝光率,也增加了他们没有撒谎的朋友的曝光率。我们的分析强烈表明,如果Facebook没有年龄限制,隐私泄露将大大减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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