{"title":"Distributed Software-based Attestation for Node Compromise Detection in Sensor Networks","authors":"Yi Yang, Xinran Wang, Sencun Zhu, G. Cao","doi":"10.1109/SRDS.2007.31","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Sensors that operate in an unattended, harsh or hostile environment are vulnerable to compromises because their low costs preclude the use of expensive tamper-resistant hardware. Thus, an adversary may reprogram them with malicious code to launch various insider attacks. Based on verifying the genuineness of the running program, we propose two distributed software-based attestation schemes that are well tailored for sensor networks. These schemes are based on a pseudorandom noise generation mechanism and a lightweight block-based pseudorandom memory traversal algorithm. Each node is loaded with pseudorandom noise in its empty program memory before deployment, and later on multiple neighbors of a suspicious node collaborate to verify the integrity of the code running on this node in a distributed manner. Our analysis and simulation show that these schemes achieve high detection rate even when multiple compromised neighbors collude in an attestation process.","PeriodicalId":224921,"journal":{"name":"2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007)","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"166","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2007 26th IEEE International Symposium on Reliable Distributed Systems (SRDS 2007)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/SRDS.2007.31","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 166
Abstract
Sensors that operate in an unattended, harsh or hostile environment are vulnerable to compromises because their low costs preclude the use of expensive tamper-resistant hardware. Thus, an adversary may reprogram them with malicious code to launch various insider attacks. Based on verifying the genuineness of the running program, we propose two distributed software-based attestation schemes that are well tailored for sensor networks. These schemes are based on a pseudorandom noise generation mechanism and a lightweight block-based pseudorandom memory traversal algorithm. Each node is loaded with pseudorandom noise in its empty program memory before deployment, and later on multiple neighbors of a suspicious node collaborate to verify the integrity of the code running on this node in a distributed manner. Our analysis and simulation show that these schemes achieve high detection rate even when multiple compromised neighbors collude in an attestation process.